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For over a century, politicians, government officials and scholars in the
United States have debated whether corporate tax returns, which are cur-
rently subject to broad tax privacy protections, should be publicly accessible.
The ongoing global discussion of base erosion and profit shifting by mul-
tinational corporations has generated calls for greater tax transparency.
Throughout this debate, participants have focused exclusively on the poten-
tial reactions of a corporation’s managers, shareholders and consumers to a
corporation’s disclosure of its own tax return information. There is, how-
ever, another perspective: how would the ability of a corporation’s stakehold-
ers and agents to observe other corporations’ tax return information affect
the corporation’s compliance with the tax law?
This Article examines the relationship of corporate tax privacy and tax com-
pliance from this new vantage point, which it terms the “intercorporate per-
spective.” The primary claim of this Article is that corporate tax privacy may
limit the pressure to engage in more aggressive tax planning and reporting
that corporate tax directors face from significant shareholders, non-tax
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managers, and even themselves. Specifically, tax privacy provides the gov-
ernment with valuable strategic defenses by restraining the ability of a corpo-
ration’s stakeholders and agents to engage in benchmarking and reverse en-
gineering, behaviors that would likely cause some tax directors to pursue
more aggressive tax planning and reporting. Yet increased public access
would also enrich public awareness and debate of corporate tax reform is-
sues, which could motivate legislators to act.
The result of this analysis, thus, is not a recommendation that all corporate
tax return information should receive tax privacy protections. Rather, this
Article offers a set of guidelines, including consideration of the strategic de-
fenses of corporate tax privacy, which will better equip policymakers to evalu-
ate specific proposals to make corporate tax return information public.
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INTRODUCTION
As one of its core missions, Google strives to empower its
users to navigate vast quantities of information—whether web
pages, family photos or alternative driving routes—as quickly
and as easily as possible.1 An emphasis on achieving creative
and efficient solutions pervades Google’s business opera-
tions2—including its own tax planning. For example, during
the past decade, while Google earned billions of dollars in on-
line advertising revenue in the United States and abroad, it
also minimized its global tax liabilities by deploying labyrin-
thine legal structures such as the “Double Irish Dutch Sand-
wich,” in which the company’s earnings in Europe, the Middle
East, and Africa were distributed from an Irish subsidiary to a
Dutch subsidiary to the Bermuda branch of another Irish sub-
sidiary, where the tax rate on corporate income was zero.3
Google is by no means alone in pursuit of lower taxes, as many
other household name corporations, including Apple,4
1. Ten Things We Know to Be True, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
about/company/philosophy/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
2. See, e.g., STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS AND
SHAPES OUR LIVES 9–69 (Simon & Schuster eds., 1st ed. 2011) (describing
Google’s business culture).
3. See Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Is Lost to Tax
Loopholes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-
to-tax-loopholes.html. For detailed discussion, see Edward D. Kleinbard,
Stateless Income, 11 FL. TAX. REV. 699, 701–14 (2011).
4. See Memorandum from Senators Carl Levin and John McCain on Off-
shore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.) to the
Members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (May 21, 2013)
(on file with the author).
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Starbucks,5 and Amazon,6 among others,7 have deployed simi-
lar tax strategies. But because the tax returns of corporations,
like all tax returns in the United States, are protected by broad
tax privacy rules,8 the surprisingly low tax burdens and specific
tax avoidance techniques of Google and a handful of other
multinational corporations have entered the public conscious-
ness not as a result of voluntary disclosures by the corporations
themselves, but rather, through a combination of legislative
hearings, whistleblower reports, and investigative journalism.9
Policymakers in the United States and around the globe
have intensified their focus on corporate tax avoidance strate-
gies in recent years. In 2013 and 2014, for example, the U.S.
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations held high-
profile hearings on profit shifting from high-tax to low-tax ju-
risdictions by multinational corporations,10 estimated to cost
the United States at least $90 billion in lost tax revenue annu-
ally,11 as well as the reporting of earnings of U.S. multinational
corporations outside of the reach of the U.S. tax system, esti-
mated at as much as $2 trillion.12 Internationally, in 2013,
leaders of the Group of Twenty nations committed to develop
5. See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Through a Latte, Darkly: Starbucks’s State-
less Income Planning, 139 TAX NOTES 1515, 1516–35 (June 24, 2013).
6. Tom Bergin, Insight: In Europe’s Tax Race, It’s the Base, Not the Rate,
That Counts, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2013, 5:36 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/02/18/us-tax-contest-europe-idUSBRE91H07B20130218
(describing Amazon’s tax planning).
7. See, e.g., Jesse Drucker, U.S. Companies Dodge $60 Billion in Taxes Even
Tea Party Condemns, BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-13/american-companies-dodge-60-billion-in-
taxes-even-tea-party-would-condemn.html.
8. I.R.C. § 6103 (2012).
9. See, e.g., Drucker, supra note 3; HOUSE OF COMMONS COMMITTEE OF
PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, TAX AVOIDANCE—GOOGLE, 2013-4, H.C. 2013.9.
10. See, e.g., Levin & McCain, supra note 4; Caterpillar’s Offshore Tax Strat-
egy: Hearing Before the S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 113th Cong.
(2014).
11. See Kimberly A. Clausing, The Revenue Effects of Multinational Firm In-
come Shifting, 130 TAX NOTES 1580, 1585 (Mar. 28, 2011) (“The best estimate
of the revenue loss associated with the income shifting of multinational firms
in 2008 is approximately $90 billion, or about 30 percent of the U.S. govern-
ment corporate tax revenues.”).
12. See Testimony of Edward D. Kleinbard, in Tax Reform: Tax Havens,
Base Erosion and Profit-Shifting: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Ways & Means,
113th Cong. 6 (2013) (statement of Edward D. Kleinbard, Professor of Law,
University of Southern California Gould School of Law).
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an action plan through the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD) for combating base erosion
and profit shifting (BEPS), strategies that allow multinational
corporations to pay little or even no taxes to any govern-
ment.13 In the midst of this global examination, policymakers,
commentators and scholars have increasingly issued calls for
greater tax transparency by multinational corporations. Many
have posed a familiar question: should the tax returns of cor-
porations be publicly accessible?14
The arguments for and against public disclosure of corpo-
rate tax returns have remained remarkably consistent through-
out the past century. While the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909
required corporate tax returns to be open to public inspec-
tion,15 under current law, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
is prohibited from releasing any return information of a cor-
poration publicly.16 Proponents of public disclosure, ranging
from President William Howard Taft17 to present-day scholars
such as Reuven Avi-Yonah,18 Richard Pomp,19 Joseph Thorn-
13. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en.
14. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, Can Publicity Curb Corporate Tax Avoidance?,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2013), http://blogs.ft.com/the-a-list/2013/01/31/can-
publicity-curb-corporate-tax-avoidance/; Allison Christians, Do We Need to
Know More About Our Public Companies?, 66 TAX NOTES INT’L 843 (May 28,
2012); Felix Salmon, Why Public Companies Should Have Public Tax Returns,
REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/05/
21/why-public-companies-should-have-public-tax-returns/; EDITORIAL BD. OF
BLOOMBERG VIEW, On Corporate Taxes, Put the Public in Publicly Traded: View,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-10-06/on-corporate-taxes-put-the-public-in-publicly-traded-view.html;
Catherine Rampell, Shareholders, Public Deserve Tax Transparency, WASH. POST
(Aug 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/catherine-
rampell-shareholders-public-deserve-tax-transparency/2014/08/21/f547d
980-296d-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html.
15. Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (repealed).
16. I.R.C. §§ 6103(a), (b)(2), (c) (2012).
17. 44 CONG. REC. 3344-45 (1909) (recording President Taft’s letter to
the Senate as it was read on June 16, 1909). For discussion, see Marjorie
Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origin of the Corporate Income Tax, 66
IND. L.J. 55, 96 (1990); STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 68–74 (Oxford
U. Press, 2010).
18. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Ariel Siman, The One Percent Solution: Corporate
Tax Returns Should Be Public (And How to Get There), 73 TAX NOTES INT’L 627
(2014).
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dike20 and Marjorie Kornhauser,21 assert that mandated public
disclosure of corporate tax returns would increase the detec-
tion capabilities of the IRS, introduce shaming as a powerful
abuse deterrent, and enhance public education regarding cor-
porate tax issues. In response, opponents typically argue that
such disclosure measures would violate equity principles by
treating corporate taxpayers differently from individual tax-
payers, lead to information overload rather than enlighten-
ment, and expose proprietary information, which could di-
minish corporations’ willingness to cooperate with the IRS.22
Several of these defenses are not convincing justifications for
corporate tax privacy as a result of their questionable theoreti-
cal and empirical foundations.23
Throughout this debate, participants have focused exclu-
sively on the potential reactions of a corporation’s managers,
shareholders, and consumers to a corporation’s disclosure of
its own tax return information. They have questioned, for in-
stance, whether managers would be hesitant to deliver infor-
mation to the IRS or decline to participate in tax avoidance
strategies if they knew others—shareholders, advocacy groups,
consumers, non-U.S. governments—could also observe these
actions. There is, however, another perspective, which neither
policymakers nor scholars have considered thus far: how
would the ability of a corporation’s stakeholders and agents to
observe other corporations’ tax return information affect the
corporation’s compliance with the tax law?
This Article examines the relationship of corporate tax
privacy and tax compliance from this new vantage point, which
19. Richard D. Pomp, The Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax Data:
Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 373 (1993).
20. Joe Thorndike, Promoting Honesty by Releasing Corporate Tax Returns, 96
TAX NOTES 324 (July 15, 2002).
21. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing
Tax Information Increase Compliance?, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 95, 113 (2005); see
also Mark W. Everson, A Reform Tool: Tax Returns, WASH. POST (Oct. 18,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/
17/AR20081017 02493.html.
22. See, e.g., TAX EXEC. INST., Comments on Massachusetts Initiative to Require
Disclosure of Corporate Tax Returns, 44 TAX EXECUTIVE 300 (1992); Tax Execu-
tives Institute, TEI Opposes Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Returns, 58 TAX
EXECUTIVE 241 (2006).
23. See infra notes 124–43 and accompanying text.
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it terms the “intercorporate perspective.”24 The primary claim
of this Article is that corporate tax privacy may limit the pres-
sure to engage in more aggressive tax planning and reporting
that corporate tax directors face from significant shareholders,
non-tax managers, and even themselves. Corporate tax aggres-
siveness occurs where corporations use complex transactions
that appear to comply with the literal text of the Internal Reve-
nue Code to obtain valuable tax benefits that Congress did not
intend.25 Corporate tax privacy provides the government with
valuable strategic defenses by restraining the ability of a corpo-
ration’s stakeholders and agents to engage in benchmarking
and reverse engineering, behaviors that would likely cause
some tax directors to pursue more aggressive tax planning and
reporting. Yet increased public access to certain return infor-
mation would also enrich public awareness and debate of cor-
porate tax reform issues, which could motivate legislators to
act. The result of this analysis, thus, is not a recommendation
that all corporate tax return information should receive tax
privacy protections. Rather, the Article offers a set of guide-
lines, including consideration of the strategic defenses of cor-
porate tax privacy, which will better equip policymakers to
evaluate specific proposals to make corporate tax return infor-
mation public.26
Corporate tax directors routinely navigate gray areas of
the tax law.27 A corporation’s willingness to pursue aggressive
tax strategies, however, is not dependent solely on the risk or
uncertainty tolerance of the tax director. Influential share-
24. I have considered the interaction of individual tax privacy and volun-
tary compliance in previous work. See Joshua D. Blank, In Defense of Individual
Tax Privacy, 61 EMORY L.J. 265 (2011); Joshua D. Blank, United States National
Report on Tax Privacy, in TAX SECRECY AND TAX TRANSPARENCY—THE RELE-
VANCE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN TAX LAW (Eleonor Kristoffersson et al. eds.,
2013).
25. See, e.g., Mary M. Frank et al., Tax Reporting Aggressiveness and Its Rela-
tion to Aggressive Financial Reporting, 84 ACCT’ING. REV. 467, 468 (2009) (defin-
ing aggressive tax reporting as “downward manipulation of taxable income
through tax planning that may or may not be considered fraudulent tax eva-
sion”); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25
VA. TAX REV. 339, 366 (2005) (discussing “aggressive exploitation of unin-
tended loopholes”); DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 25 (2004) (discussing aggressive tax planning).
26. See infra Part III.A.
27. See infra notes 144–48 and accompanying text.
38 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:31
holders, notably activist investment funds, have played a signif-
icant role in attempting to influence the tax strategies of cor-
porations.28 Additionally, as several studies have shown, the in-
fluence of the board of directors and non-tax management,
which ultimately answer to shareholders, can affect the tax
planning decisions of the tax department.29 And tax lawyers
and accountants also facilitate aggressive corporate tax plan-
ning by designing novel tax avoidance strategies and issuing
tax opinions that can protect corporations from tax penalties.
Corporate tax privacy, I argue, provides the government
with two strategic defenses against increased corporate tax ag-
gressiveness.
First, corporate tax privacy constrains the ability of the
stakeholders and agents of a corporation to establish
benchmarks of aggressiveness in several tax compliance ar-
eas.30 For example, public disclosure of complete corporate
tax returns, a position advocated by several scholars and
policymakers, would reveal specific documents that would
show whether a corporation’s competitors had engaged in cer-
tain related party transfer pricing structures or had moved
businesses offshore to avoid U.S. taxation.31 Significant share-
holders of corporations that do not engage in such strategies
could use this newly available information to pressure manage-
ment to pursue more aggressive transfer pricing planning.32
With access to “red flag” disclosure forms that corporations are
required to file with the IRS, activist investment funds, non-tax
management, significant shareholders and corporate tax di-
rectors could also evaluate their own corporation’s relative tax
aggressiveness in pursuing potentially abusive tax strategies
and in disclosing the transactions to the IRS.33 They could use
other corporations’ disclosures to urge the corporate tax di-
rector to engage in more aggressive tax planning, including
specific strategies attempted by competitors. And, as past expe-
rience indicates, tax advisors, such as the “Big Four” account-
ing firms, would likely be eager to utilize tax return informa-
28. See infra notes 167–70 and accompanying text.
29. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part III.C.2.
31. See infra notes 303–09 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 310–11 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 322–28 and accompanying text.
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tion to establish benchmarks in specific tax compliance areas
and solicit business from overly conservative corporate tax di-
rectors.34
Second, corporate tax privacy hampers the ability of so-
phisticated advisors and, ultimately, corporate tax directors to
observe documents that would allow them to reverse engineer
the IRS’s enforcement strategies.35 Public disclosure of certain
corporate tax return information would enable sophisticated
analysts to observe controversies where the IRS asserted tax de-
ficiencies, applied tax penalties and entered into settlements
with other corporations.36 For example, while many corporate
managers and their advisors have expressed uneasiness regard-
ing the potential application by the IRS of a 40% strict liability
tax penalty for transactions that lack economic substance,37
under current law, these managers cannot see whether and
why any of their competitor firms have been subject to this tax
penalty. With public access to information that would reveal
the IRS’s use of the tax penalty, on the other hand, corporate
tax directors could determine which corporations received the
penalty and the types of tax positions that caused the IRS to
apply it.38 Most importantly, if complete corporate tax returns
were publicly accessible, tax advisory firms and other sophisti-
cated analysts would gain an increased ability to apply quanti-
tative rather than anecdotal methods to model the statistical
likelihood that certain tax positions and filing actions would
result in detection and challenge by the IRS.39 With the aid of
statistical analysis of publicly available information, corporate
tax directors could adjust their behavior to engage in strate-
gies with the lowest probability of IRS detection, deficiency
challenges, and tax penalties.
Despite the strategic defenses of corporate tax privacy,
however, there are also significant potential benefits to public
awareness and debate that would result from requiring some
corporate tax return information to be publicly accessible.40
Without the identities of specific taxpayers involved, the public
34. See infra notes 179–80 and accompanying text.
35. See infra Part III.C.3.
36. See infra notes 332–41 and accompanying text.
37. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2012).
38. See infra notes 371–77 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 207–22 and accompanying text.
40. See infra Part III.A.3.
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shows little interest in anonymous statistics or arcane statutory
provisions. Public access, by contrast, would enable the media
to publicize specific corporations’ annual federal tax liability,
the amount of cash taxes (actual dollars) paid to the U.S. gov-
ernment, and the amount of tax owed and paid to govern-
ments other than the U.S. federal government.41 Public access
to corporate tax returns could also highlight the existence of
corporate tax expenditure provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code by revealing examples of well-known corporations that
have benefited from them. With increased public debate, legis-
lators might make corporate tax legislation and reform a
higher priority than they do currently.
What corporate tax return information, if any, should be
publicly accessible? Participants in this debate often reach the
conclusion that corporate tax returns either should remain
completely confidential or should become completely accessi-
ble by the public.42 In contrast to this all-or-nothing approach,
I propose that policymakers should consider the effect of each
public disclosure proposal on: (1) the strategic defenses of
corporate tax privacy; (2) exposure of proprietary information
of corporate taxpayers; and (3) public awareness and debate
of corporate tax issues.43 An advantage of this approach is that
policymakers can apply these three factors to evaluate options
from a menu of corporate tax return public access possibili-
ties. For example, after taking these factors into account, I de-
scribe several examples of corporate tax return information,
consisting primarily of schedules and forms that disclose the
details of specific tax positions or IRS enforcement actions,
that should not be publicly accessible: complete tax returns;
payment of economic substance tax penalties; and base ero-
sion and profit shifting reporting proposed by the OECD.44 At
41. See id.
42. Others take a more restrained approach. See, e.g., David Lenter, Joel
Slemrod & Douglas Shackelford, Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Return Infor-
mation: Accounting, Economics, and Legal Perspectives, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 803
(2003) (advocating for limited public disclosure); Edward D. Kleinbard &
Peter C. Canellos, IRS Should Release Schedules M-3, Not Entire Corporate Tax
Returns, 110 TAX NOTES 1485 (2006) (advocating for public release of IRS
Schedule M-3 only); Daniel N. Shaviro, The Optimal Relationship Between Taxa-
ble Income and Financial Accounting Income: Analysis and a Proposal, 97 GEO. L.J.
423, 427 n.11 (2009) (advocating for public release of IRS Schedule M-3).
43. See infra Part III.A.
44. See infra Part III.B.
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the same time, however, I suggest several types of corporate
tax return information, including significant portions of cor-
porate tax returns themselves, that should be publicly accessi-
ble: IRS Form 1120 only (the annual U.S. corporate tax re-
turn); IRS Schedule M-3 (book/tax reconciliation form); and
corporate “pink slips.”45
This Article reviews several specific corporate tax return
documents that could facilitate benchmarking and reverse en-
gineering, and draws on studies of taxpayer behavior in other
contexts.46 It also considers examples of recent actions by
management in response to proposals from influential share-
holders, including in the tax context.47 While this Article does
not report the results of empirical analysis or experiments con-
ducted directly as part of this investigation, it seeks to stimu-
late empirical and experimental studies of the effects of the
intercorporate perspective.48 In addition, as the debate has fo-
cused on publicly traded corporations49—which are already
45. See infra Part III.C.
46. See infra notes 304–09, 332–39.
47. See infra notes 89, 152, 158, 165, 188, 203, 301, 351, 371 and accompa-
nying text.
48. Empirical scholarship regarding publicity of corporate tax return in-
formation has focused largely on non-U.S. jurisdictions and has not consid-
ered the intercorporate perspective. See, e.g., Scott Dyreng, Jeffrey L. Hoopes
& Jaron H. Wilde, Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior (Fisher Coll. of
Bus., Working Paper No. 2014-02-003, 2014) (examining response of U.K.
firms to subsidiary disclosure requirement); Makoto Hasegawa et al., The Ef-
fect of Public Disclosure on Reported Taxable Income: Evidence from Individuals and
Corporations in Japan, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 571 (2013) (reporting results from
study involving Japanese public disclosure of corporate tax returns). Empiri-
cal scholars could conduct experiments involving the intercorporate per-
spective similar to those conducted in the individual tax context. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS (1996), available at http://
www.revenue.state.mn.us/research_stats/research_reports/19xx/research_
reports_content_complnce.pdf. The IRS also offers a limited number of
researchers the ability to review confidential tax return data for research
purposes. See, e.g., Jeffrey Mervis, How Two Economists Got Direct Access to IRS
Tax Records, SCIENCE (May 22, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/
2014/05/how-two-economists-got-direct-access-irs-tax-records (describing
Raj Chetty and Emmanuel Saez’s research).
49. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 18 (hypothesizing about
mandatory publication of tax returns for “all publicly traded corporations”);
Salmon, supra note 14 (referring to “public U.S. companies”), EDITORIAL BD.
OF BLOOMBERG, supra note 14 (discussing “Put the Public in Publicly
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subject to requirements to disclose significant business and fi-
nancial information, including limited tax information,50 in
public filings—I restrict my analysis to publicly traded corpora-
tions.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I
describes the evolution of corporate tax privacy, the limited
corporate tax return information publicly observable today
and common arguments presented in the corporate tax pri-
vacy debate. Part II presents the strategic defenses against in-
creased corporate tax aggressiveness that corporate tax privacy
provides to the government. Part III offers guiding principles
that should enable policymakers to determine whether corpo-
rate tax return information should be publicly accessible and
applies these principles to several examples, and is followed by
the conclusion.
I.
WHY CORPORATE TAX PRIVACY?
Since the birth of the corporate income tax in the United
States, policymakers have debated whether the tax returns of
corporations should be accessible by the public. Should the
tax return information of corporations be treated differently
from that of individuals? Does the public’s “right to know” out-
weigh a corporation’s “right to privacy”? And what social good
or harm would result from providing the public with access to
corporate tax return information? This Part briefly reviews the
evolution of corporate tax privacy in the United States, de-
scribes corporate tax information that is observable from pub-
lic sources today, and considers the traditional arguments for
and against public disclosure of corporate tax return informa-
tion.
A. The Evolution of Corporate Tax Privacy
The public’s ability to observe tax return information of
U.S. corporations, from Standard Oil to Google, has fluctu-
ated throughout the history of the corporate income tax. This
Traded”); Rampell, supra note 14 (“Require all publicly traded companies to
make their tax returns public. Period.”).
50. See infra notes 70–91 and accompanying text.
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Subpart discusses major events in the evolution of corporate
tax privacy.
Corporate Excise Tax of 1909. At the height of the Progres-
sive Era, Congress enacted the Corporate Excise Tax of 1909.51
In its initial form, the legislation imposed a new one-percent
tax on net corporate income in excess of $5,000.52 In addition,
Congress provided that corporate tax returns “shall constitute
public records and be open to inspection as such.”53 President
William Howard Taft commended “the publicity feature of the
law [as] the only thing which [made] the law of any special
value” because it would aid the government’s regulation of
corporations.54
Despite its proclaimed regulatory benefits, public access
to corporate tax returns was limited. After deliberation, the
Treasury determined that only tax returns themselves, and not
documents related to tax audits by the IRS, were open to in-
spection.55 Congress, however, failed to appropriate the funds
necessary for the IRS to maintain all corporate tax returns in
an organized, searchable form56 and, ultimately, repealed the
provision.57
1924 Corporate Tax Return Publicity. The issue of public ac-
cess to corporate tax return information arose again in 1924,
when a group of progressive U.S. senators spearheaded legisla-
tion that permitted the public to view the amount of income
tax paid by every taxpayer, including corporations.58 Newspa-
pers published on their front pages the names of large corpo-
rations, such as Ford Motor Company, and celebrities, such as
Charlie Chaplin, and the amounts of their corresponding tax
51. Act of August 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112. For histories of the
Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, see Kornhauser, supra note 17; BANK, supra
note 17.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 116.
54. ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 57
(2006).
55. See No Publicity Now in Corporation Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1910, at 1.
56. See id.
57. T.D. 1665, 13 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 117 (1910).
58. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 257(b), 43 Stat. 253, 293; see also
MARK LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC REFORM 67 (1984).
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payments.59 After intense lobbying by opponents, Congress re-
vised the law in early 1926 to require only the names and ad-
dresses of individuals who filed tax returns, and not their tax
payments, to be treated as public record.60
The “Pink Slip” Requirement of 1934. In the midst of the
Great Depression in 1934, Congress enacted legislation that
required all taxpayers, both individuals and corporations, to
file with their annual tax returns a “pink slip,” which would be
open to public inspection.61 Each pink slip would contain the
taxpayer’s name and address, total gross income, total deduc-
tions, net income, total credits, and tax liability, even if the
taxpayer owed no tax liability.62 Following passage of the legis-
lation, however, the “Sentinels of the Republic,” a conservative
group of senators, argued that the pink slip requirement
would expose individuals to danger of harassment and even
kidnapping, and successfully obtained repeal of the law in
April 1935 before it ever went into effect.63
Present Law. Over forty years later, Congress enacted the
Tax Reform Act of 1976.64 The basic framework of this legisla-
tion continues to apply. Under current law, all tax return in-
formation and tax returns of individuals and corporations are
confidential.65 Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code
protects the confidentiality of “returns” and “return informa-
tion” and broadly defines both terms to include “any tax or
information return;”66 any amendments filed with the IRS;
and any taxpayer’s identity, income, tax deductions, tax cred-
its, audit and penalty history, among many other items. Absent
a corporation’s voluntary disclosure, only shareholders who
59. See, e.g., Income Revelation Stirs Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1924, at
1; La Follette Hails Publicity of Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1924, at 3; New York—
Its Big Income, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1924, at 2.
60. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 257(e), 44 Stat. 9, 52 (amended 1934).
61. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 55(b), 48 Stat. 680, 698.
62. Id.; see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion and the
Law: How a “Common Man” Campaign Ended a Rich Man’s Law, 73 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 129–30 (2010).
63. See Kornhauser, supra note 62, at 135–38; Raymond Pitcairn, The Pink-
Slip Strike, SATURDAY EVENING POST, June 8, 1935, at 23.
64. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
65. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2012).
66. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1) (2012).
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own one-percent or more of the corporation’s stock are legally
entitled to review that corporation’s tax return.67
B. Corporate Tax Return Information Observable Today
Extracting information about the tax liabilities, payments
and strategies of U.S. corporations from publicly available
sources is no easy task.68 Even though publicly traded corpora-
tions are required to disclose voluminous non-tax financial in-
formation in a variety of public fora, tax privacy shields nearly
all tax return information from public view.
The primary sources of corporate tax return information
observable today are documents filed by publicly traded corpo-
rations with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission
(SEC). A corporation’s annual Form 10-K includes financial
statements, which are governed by generally accepted account-
ing principles (GAAP), as interpreted by the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB).69 In their financial state-
ments, corporations must include a footnote containing a
number of specific disclosures related to their income tax ex-
penses.70 A description of tax information that publicly traded
corporations disclose in their SEC filings is presented below,
using a recent Form 10-K of Google for illustration.71
Global Effective Tax Rate. Publicly traded corporations are
required to disclose their “effective tax rate” each year in their
Form 10-K.72 For example, in its 2011 Form 10-K, Google dis-
closed an effective tax rate of 21%.73 For purposes of deter-
mining Google’s U.S. income tax liability or any tax payment
to the U.S., however, this rate is highly ambiguous. The figure
is calculated using Google’s GAAP income, not its U.S. taxable
67. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1)(D)(iii) (2012).
68. See, e.g., Michelle Hanlon, What Can We Infer About a Firm’s Taxable
Income from Its Financial Statements?, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 831 (2003).
69. SEC Form 10-K, available at http://www.sec.gov/answers/form10k.
htm.
70. INCOME TAXES, Accounting Standards Codification, § 740-10 (Fin. Ac-
counting Standards Bd. 2009).
71. Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Jan. 26, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312512025336/
d260164d10k.htm
72. INCOME TAXES, Accounting Standards Codification, § 740-10-30 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 2009).
73. Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 71, at 36.
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income, and using a GAAP measure of tax expense, not a cash
tax measure.74 GAAP accounting treats certain significant
items, such as municipal bond interest, goodwill, and depreci-
ation of tangible property differently from income tax ac-
counting.75 In addition, Google reports its effective tax rate on
a global, rather than U.S., basis.76
Cash Taxes Paid. Unless a corporation voluntarily discloses
the information, it is extraordinarily difficult for nonexpert
observers, including journalists, to discern from a corpora-
tion’s public filings the amount of cash taxes the corporation
actually paid to any government. As the vast majority of corpo-
rations report on the “indirect method” of cash flow state-
ments, the specific amount of cash taxes paid to the U.S. or
other governments is not apparent from SEC disclosure docu-
ments.77
Uncertain Tax Positions. In 2006, FASB issued Interpreta-
tion 48 of Financial Accounting Standard 109,78 which pre-
vents corporations from recognizing tax benefits for financial
accounting purposes unless they are “more likely than not” to
be upheld if audited by the IRS and subject to review by a
court of competent jurisdiction.79 Corporations must disclose
their aggregate tax reserves established for uncertain tax posi-
tions in their Form 10-K, along with certain other information,
but generally are not required to report on specific tax uncer-
tainties.80 For example, in 2011, Google showed a final bal-
74. Id. To reach the 21% figure, Google divided its $2.589 billion tax
provision for 2011, a GAAP figure, by $12.326 billion of global income, an-
other GAAP figure. Id.
75. For discussion, see Shaviro, supra note 42; Kleinbard, supra note 3, at
741 n.96.
76. See INCOME TAXES, Accounting Standards Codification, § 740-270-35-3
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009); INCOME TAXES, Accounting Standards
Codification § 740-270-30-19 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009).
77. See, e.g., CHARLES T. HORNGREN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING 193 (11th ed. 2013) (Ch. 5, Statement of Cash Flows).
78. ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES, Statement of Fin.
Accounting Standards No. 48 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2006) (codi-
fied at INCOME TAXES, Accounting Standards Codification, § 740-10-25-6-7, at
13 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009)).
79. INCOME TAXES, Accounting Standards Codification, § 740-10-55-3
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009).
80. Id. § 740-10-25-6-7.
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ance of $1.56 billion in uncertain tax positions,81 but provided
no explanation of the components of this uncertainty.
Net Operating Loss Carryforwards. One specific U.S. tax item
that corporations are required to disclose in SEC filings is the
amount of their net operating losses.82 When a corporation’s
taxable losses exceed its taxable income, a net operating loss,
which can be carried forward to offset taxable income in later
tax years, subject to limitations under Section 382 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, results.83 In its 2011 Form 10-K, Google
reported that as of December 31, 2011, it had federal and state
net operating loss carryforwards for income tax purposes of
approximately $420 million and $310 million, respectively.84
Permanently Reinvested Earnings. Large U.S. multinational
corporations defer U.S. tax liability on their non-U.S. earnings
by keeping them offshore in non-U.S. subsidiaries. Under nor-
mal rules of accounting, a corporation would have to antici-
pate the ultimate distribution of untaxed foreign subsidiary
earnings and thus account for the future U.S. tax conse-
quences today by impacting earnings and establishing a “de-
ferred tax liability.”85 If a corporation makes an election, how-
ever, it is not required to establish a deferred tax liability for
the U.S. tax that would result upon repatriation of the off-
shore earnings as long as these earnings are “permanently re-
invested earnings.”86 Corporations must disclose the cumula-
tive amount of permanently reinvested earnings for which they
did not establish a deferred tax liability and the amount of the
estimated deferred tax liability associated with these unrepa-
triated earnings, unless it is not practicable to do so.87 For ex-
ample, in its 2011 Form 10-K, Google reported that its non-
U.S. subsidiaries held $21.1 billion of earnings at the end of
2011, but that “determination of the amount of unrecognized
deferred tax liability related to these earnings is not practica-
81. Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 71, at 81.
82. INCOME TAXES, Accounting Standards Codification, § 740-10-50-3(a)
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009).
83. I.R.C. § 382 (2012).
84. Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 71, at 36.
85. FOREIGN CURRENCY MATTERS, Accounting Standards Codification,
§ 830-30-45-21 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009).
86. INCOME TAXES, Accounting Standards Codification, § 740-10-55-209
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009).
87. Id. §§ 740-30-50-1, 2.
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ble.”88 One study has found that many large multinational cor-
porations fail to comply with the requirement to disclose per-
manently reinvested earnings and that an overwhelming ma-
jority of firms (71.60–83.1%) either disclose that the
calculation of the deferred tax liability is not practicable or fail
to address the deferred tax liability at all.89
Tax Penalties, Audits and Other Material Risks. Finally, SEC
filings describe a corporation’s IRS audits and payment of tax
penalties in limited circumstances and without much detail.
Even if these events meet the SEC’s materiality threshold,
managers often use vague language to report them. For exam-
ple, Google’s statements regarding its audits in its 2011 Form
10-K range in specificity from “our 2003 through 2011 tax
years remain subject to examination by the appropriate gov-
ernmental agencies for Irish tax purposes”90 to “we are subject
to continuous examination of our income tax returns by the
IRS and other tax authorities.”91
C. The Corporate Tax Privacy Debate
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, tax privacy
conceals most corporate tax return information from public
view. U.S. securities and accounting regulations do little to
bring corporate tax return information to light, even for pub-
licly traded corporations. This Subpart outlines the primary ar-
guments offered by proponents and opponents of mandated
public disclosure over the course of the past century and con-
siders the merits of each of them.
1. Arguments for Public Disclosure
Proponents of mandated public disclosure have argued
that providing the public with access to corporations’ tax re-
turns would enhance the ability of the government to detect
questionable tax positions, deter the managers of a corpora-
tion from pursuing aggressive tax strategies for fear of public
88. Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 71, at 80.
89. Benjamin C. Ayers, Casey M. Schwab & Steven Utke, Noncompliance
with Mandatory Disclosure Requirements: The Magnitude and Determinants of Un-
disclosed Permanently Reinvested Earnings, ACCT. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
90. Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 71, at 82.
91. Id. at 37. Most large public corporations use similar formulations
when discussing audits.
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shaming and educate the public regarding the corporate tax
law.
a. Increased Detection
Public disclosure proponents assert that by exposing a
corporation’s tax returns to “[m]illions of eyes,” the govern-
ment would enlist the assistance of the public as a “watchdog,”
which would aid its tax enforcement efforts.92 Some scholars,
such as Marjorie Kornhauser and Laurence Kotlikoff, have ar-
gued that mandated public disclosure would serve as an “auto-
matic enforcement device”93 by “increas[ing] the chance of
getting caught” due to public scrutiny.94 Others have argued
that enhanced detection is especially likely as a result of the
IRS’s ability to provide whistleblower rewards to informants.95
Under current law, the IRS pays informants rewards of up to
30% of the proceeds that it collects using information they
have provided to the IRS.96 In the case of information that
originated in news reports, the IRS pays rewards of up to 10%
of the proceeds collected.97
This rationale for mandated public disclosure depends on
several questionable assumptions. The argument first assumes
that the IRS would have the audit capacity to investigate the
large volume of tips from citizens and reporters that could re-
sult from a public access regime, even though many of them
may not lead to the discovery of tax noncompliance. A review
of the IRS’s historic resource weaknesses should cast signifi-
cant doubt on this assumption.98 Further, while the IRS has
paid rewards to informants, including a $104 million reward to
ex-UBS employee Bradley Birkenfeld in 2013,99 the individuals
92. See, e.g., Joseph J. Thorndike, The Thorndike Challenge, 122 TAX NOTES
691, 691–92 (2009).
93. Anna Bernasek, Should Tax Bills Be Public Information?, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2010, at BU11 (quoting Professor Kotlikoff’s statement).
94. Kornhauser, supra note 21.
95. See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61
TAX LAW. 357, 385 (2008).
96. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(1) (2012).
97. I.R.C. § 7623(b)(2)(A) (2012).
98. See IRS OVERSIGHT BD., FY2011 IRS BUDGET RECOMMENDATION SPE-
CIAL REP. 9–11 (2010), available at http://www.foreffectivegov.org/files/
budget/IRSOBFY11BUDGETREPORT.pdf.
99. See David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blower Awarded $104 Million by I.R.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, at A1.
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who are most capable of reporting the most valuable informa-
tion to the IRS are those who, like Birkenfeld, are already
working inside the corporation, often in the tax depart-
ment.100 It is unlikely that the participation of the general pub-
lic in reviewing corporate tax returns would strengthen the
IRS’s ability to obtain valuable information from informants.
The detection rationale also implicitly assumes that the
public would perform a more comprehensive review of corpo-
rate tax returns than the IRS. Most of the largest U.S. corpora-
tions, however, are already under continuous IRS audit.101
Through the Coordinated Industry Case program, the IRS au-
dits more than 800 of the largest U.S. corporations’ tax returns
continuously.102 ExxonMobil Corporation, for instance, pro-
vides office space at its Houston headquarters to 35 IRS
agents, who engage in a “full-time audit” of the corporation’s
books and tax returns.103 In contrast to “cash economy” tax-
payers, who engage in transactions not subject to third-party
information reporting or withholding, multinational corpora-
tions attract significant scrutiny from the IRS. Consequently,
the argument that public disclosure would strengthen the
IRS’s detection capabilities or cause corporate tax directors to
perceive an increased probability of detection is unconvincing.
b. Public Shaming
Another frequent argument in favor of mandated public
disclosure is that it would introduce the threat of public sham-
ing as a deterrent against aggressive corporate tax planning.104
100. See Lynnley Browning, The Perks of Being a Whistle-blower, NEWSWEEK
(Jan. 30, 2014, 9:39 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/how-would-you-spend-
30-1-trillion-227390.
101. See Amy S. Elliott, News Analysis: Audit Proof? How Hedge Funds, PE
Funds, and PTPs Escape the IRS, TAX ANALYSTS (July 23, 2012), http://www.tax
analysts.com/www/features.nsf/Articles/6BF2832AEAE95EE785257A44005
DBB39?OpenDocument.
102. See I.R.S. IRM 4.46.2.3 (July 22, 2011), available at http://www.irs.
gov/irm/part4/irm_04-046-002.html#d0e134.
103. See Steven Mufson, How Much Do Oil Companies Really Pay in Taxes?,
WASH. POST (May 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/how-much-do-oil-companies-really-pay-in-taxes/2011/05/11/AF7
UNutG_story.html.
104. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 21, at 104; Jay A. Soled & Dennis J.
Ventry, Jr., A Little Shame Might Just Deter Tax Cheaters, USA TODAY, Apr. 10,
2008, at 12A.
2014] RECONSIDERING CORPORATE TAX PRIVACY 51
Several proponents of this view have argued that in a public
disclosure regime, managers “might be leery of paying only
nominal amounts of tax”105 out of fear of backlash from share-
holders, business partners, and consumers.106 In contrast to
these claims, as I have argued elsewhere, public shaming is not
a compelling rationale for mandated public disclosure.107
There is little evidence to support the assertion that pub-
licity of a corporation’s use of aggressive, or even abusive, tax
planning would result in communal ostracism of the corpora-
tion. When the press has reported on the tax avoidance strate-
gies of large U.S. multinational corporations, the corporations
involved have not suffered significant drops in stock price,
widespread boycotts of their products, or calls from sharehold-
ers for management reform.108 Michelle Hanlon and Joel
Slemrod have found that publicity of a corporation’s use of tax
shelters does not result in drops in stock price as significant as
the types of drops that occur following public reports of finan-
cial accounting fraud.109 Another recent study found no evi-
dence that corporations that sell at least one highly rated
brand with valuable consumer reputation engage in less tax
avoidance than other corporations.110
Corporate managers appear to consider potential public
reaction when pursuing transactions that implicate patriotism
by requiring their corporations to relocate outside the United
States. During the “corporate inversion wave” of 2014, where
many U.S. corporations pursued transactions that caused them
to merge with non-U.S. target corporations, enabling them to
escape U.S. taxation,111 several politicians, including President
105. Pomp, supra note 19, at 444.
106. See, e.g., Soled & Ventry, supra note 104.
107. See Joshua D. Blank, What’s Wrong With Shaming Corporate Tax Abuse,
62 TAX L. REV. 539, 581 (2009).
108. By contrast, consider public reaction when a well-known corporation
commits an environmental or public safety offense. See, e.g., Taryn Fuchs-
Burnett, Mass Public Corporate Apology, 57 J. DISP. RESOL. 26, 31–32 (2002).
109. Michelle Hanlon & Joel Slemrod, What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal?
Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to News About Tax Shelter Involvement, 93 J.
PUB. ECON. 126, 128 (2009).
110. Chelsea Rae Austin & Ryan Wilson, Are Reputational Costs a Determi-
nant of Tax Avoidance? (Feb. 2013.), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2216879## (unpublished manuscript).
111. For discussion, see Shayndi Raice, How Tax Inversions Became the Hot-
test Trend in M&A, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2014, 3:34 PM), http://on-
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Obama, decried the transactions as “unpatriotic.”112 Neverthe-
less, numerous consumer-focused public corporations, from
Chiquita Brands International Inc.113 to Medtronic114 to My-
lan,115 among many others,116 still pursued the strategy. By
contrast, when the board of directors of Walgreens declined to
relocate its corporate headquarters to the United Kingdom as
part of its merger with British-based Alliance Boots in 2014—a
decision which caused Walgreens to continue to be subject to
U.S. corporate income tax on its worldwide income—the cor-
poration’s stock price immediately dropped over 14% in
value.117
Corporate managers routinely respond to attempts by the
government to shame corporations that push the envelope,
but do not violate explicit tax rules, by noting that their corpo-
rations’ tax positions are “perfectly legal.” For example, in his
testimony before the U.S. Senate, Tim Cook, Chief Executive
Office of Apple Inc., articulated this sentiment when he stated:
“We pay all the taxes we owe, every single dollar.”118 Shaming
campaigns often result in similar rebuttals by major corpora-
tions.119 The accepting reactions of these corporations’ share-
line.wsj.com/articles/how-tax-inversions-became-the-hottest-trend-in-m-a-
1407240175.
112. See, e.g., Katie Zezima, Obama: Tax Loophole That Allows Companies to
Leave the U.S. Is ‘Unpatriotic,’ WASH. POST (July 24, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/07/24/obama-tax-
loophole-that-allows-companies-to-leave-the-u-s-is-unpatriotic/.
113. See David Gelles, Bid Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2014, at B4.
114. See Dana Cimilluca, Dana Mattioli & Joseph Walker, Medical Merger
Part of ‘Tax Inversion’ Wave, WALL. ST. J. (June 15, 2014, 9:52 PM), http://
online.wsj.com/articles/medical-merger-part-of-tax-inversion-wave-14028763
90.
115. See Natalie Grover, Mylan Presses on with Tax-Inversion Abbott Deal,
REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2014, 1:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/
08/07/mylan-results-idUSL4N0QD46G20140807.
116. See Raice, supra note 111.
117. See Kim Hjelmgaard & Kevin McCoy, Walgreens Stock Smacked After Tax
Inversion Out, USA TODAY (Aug. 6, 2014, 5:34 PM), http://www.usatoday.
com/story/money/business/2014/08/06/walgreens-alliance-boots-chicago
/13659809/.
118. Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code-Part 2 (Apple Inc.): Hearing
Before the S. Permanent Comm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs, May 21, 2013, 113th Cong. 37 (2013) (statement of
Timothy D. Cook, Chief Executive Officer, Apple Inc.).
119. See, e.g., The Blackstone Group, Blackstone Says The New York Times
Inaccurate and Misleading: Partners To Pay Over $900 Million in Taxes as a Result
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holders and consumers strongly suggest that it is unlikely that
public disclosure of corporate tax return information, includ-
ing aggressive tax planning, would result in meaningful sham-
ing effects.
c. Public Education
A final argument in favor of public disclosure of corpo-
rate tax returns is that it could serve an educational function
by enhancing the public’s understanding of the corporate tax
law. Proponents of this view have characterized public disclo-
sure of corporate tax returns as a “powerful tool for analysts
who follow companies and industries”120 and as a way to edu-
cate the public about “how much corporations actually pay in
taxes.”121 In contrast to the rationales of increasing detection
or deterring tax avoidance through potential public shaming,
the public education rationale seeks to lessen public igno-
rance of the corporate tax laws rather than address any partic-
ular corporate tax planning behaviors.
With the aid of the news media, public disclosure of cor-
porate tax return information would enable the public to
learn about the corporate tax system through vivid specific ex-
amples of named corporations. Compared to anonymous sta-
tistical information or arcane statutory language, these specific
examples would likely stimulate public debate, which could ul-
timately motivate legislative action.122 As Part III will argue, en-
hancing public awareness and debate of the corporate tax law
should serve as the primary objective of measures that would
mandate public disclosure of corporate tax return informa-
tion.123
2. Arguments Against Public Disclosure
In response to these arguments, public disclosure oppo-
nents typically offer familiar defenses of corporate tax privacy.
These include assertions that public disclosure would cause
of IPO, BUSINESS WIRE (July 13, 2007, 5:22 PM), http://www.businesswire.
com/news/home/20070713005584/en/Blackstone-York-Times-Inaccurate-
Misleading-Partners-Pay#.VLWjeb5Lx6k.
120. Everson, supra note 21.
121. See Bartlett, supra note 14.
122. See infra notes 259–69 and accompanying text.
123. See infra Part III.A.3.
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corporate taxpayers to be treated differently from individual
taxpayers, result in information overload, and expose corpora-
tions’ proprietary information to competitors. Several of these
defenses, as commonly presented, rest on shaky grounds.
a. Equity with Individuals
Opponents of proposals to require publicly traded corpo-
rations to disclose tax return information often object to these
measures on equity grounds, claiming that they rescind tax
privacy protections for corporate taxpayers, but not for indi-
viduals. For example, in response to proposals to require pub-
lic disclosure of complete corporate tax returns in the early
1990s, the Tax Executives Institute, an association of in-house
business tax professionals, responded, “just as individual tax-
payers do not wish to see the nature and extent of their ex-
penditures for medical care, for housing, or charitable pur-
poses disclosed . . . corporate taxpayers have a legitimate inter-
est in preserving the confidentiality of their myriad
expenditures and investments.”124 Other responses from op-
ponents of public disclosure contend that tax privacy is a “core
American value”125 that should be offered to “individuals and
corporations.”126 The basic argument is that as a matter of eq-
uity, corporations should not be subject to public disclosure
requirements unless they would also apply to individuals.
But corporate and individual taxpayers are different in
ways that are relevant to the tax privacy debate. First, unlike
individuals, corporations are owned by investors that have an
interest in comparing a corporation’s income reported for tax
purposes against that reported for financial accounting pur-
poses. Indeed, one reason that legislators sought the publicity
provision in 1909 was to prevent stock watering and abusive
promoter schemes.127 Second, public disclosure of certain cor-
poration tax return information, such as U.S. tax liability,
would not pose the threats to physical safety and theft that in-
dividuals might face if this information were public.128 Third,
124. TAX EXEC. INST., supra note 22.
125. Id.
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. For discussion, see Kornhauser, supra note 17.
128. See, e.g., Income Publicity Called Kidnap Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1935,
at 2.
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due to the unfamiliar nature of the substantive corporate tax
law to most people, public awareness of basic elements of the
tax law is lacking more in the corporate rather than individual
context.129
As a legal matter, neither corporations nor individuals have
a right to tax privacy sufficient to prohibit the government
from requiring public disclosure of their tax return informa-
tion. In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,130 decided in 1911, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the public inspection features of the
Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 as constitutional and within
Congress’s power to secure “the fullness and accuracy” of cor-
porations’ tax returns.131 The Court reached a similar result in
1925 in United States v. Dickey,132 when it held that Congress
could direct the IRS to open to public inspection lists of the
names of individuals and the amount of income tax paid.
While it has the legal authority to require public disclosure of
both individual and corporate tax returns, Congress has re-
frained from public disclosure measures since 1935, primarily
as a result of harassment and personal safety concerns voiced
by individuals.133 Again, these concerns do not apply equally
to corporations.
b. Information Overload
Opponents often argue that mandated public disclosure
would result in information overload rather than the delivery
of information relevant to investors, policymakers, or the gen-
eral public. For example, the Tax Executives Institute fre-
quently argues that corporate tax returns consist of “multiple
volumes” and “thousands of pages of financial and supplemen-
tal information, far exceeding the SEC’s current annual re-
porting requirements for public companies.”134 It contends
that in a public disclosure regime, “investors may not be able
to discern meaning from what would be truckloads of tax re-
turn information.”135 Opponents use this concern to conclude
129. For discussion, see infra Part III.A.3.
130. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
131. Id.
132. 268 U.S. 378 (1925).
133. See Act of Apr. 19, 1935, ch. 74, 49 Stat. 158.
134. TAX EXEC. INST., supra note 22.
135. Patti Mohr et al., Tax Scholars Discuss Corporate Disclosure, Book-Tax Re-
porting, 99 TAX NOTES 617 (2003) (quoting Fred Murray).
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that all corporate tax return information should remain pri-
vate.
This defense of corporate tax privacy is not persuasive as a
response to all corporate tax return public disclosure mea-
sures. It presumes that if a corporation’s tax returns were pub-
licly accessible, individual investors and members of the gen-
eral public would attempt to interpret corporate tax return in-
formation directly. A more plausible characterization is that if
corporations’ tax returns were public, sophisticated in-
termediaries, such as journalists, financial advisors and empiri-
cal scholars, would comb through the documents and report
relevant information.136 Moreover, as presented above, the de-
fense assumes that the only form of public disclosure is one
that would result in the delivery of “truckloads of tax return
information” to investors and the public. In reality, as Part III
will demonstrate, policymakers can consider a variety of disclo-
sure measures.137 As a result of these unrealistic assumptions,
the concern over information overload does not justify broad
tax privacy protections.
c. Proprietary Information
Last, opponents consistently argue that public disclosure
of corporate tax return information would expose a corpora-
tion’s sensitive proprietary information to the public, includ-
ing competitors. For instance, the Tax Executives Institute has
asserted that public disclosure measures would reveal “confi-
dential and proprietary data not currently contained in consol-
idated financial statements . . . to the world.”138 Opponents of
public disclosure often argue that public disclosure of proprie-
tary information would threaten tax privacy’s function as a
“cornerstone of voluntary compliance”139 by corporate taxpay-
ers. Just as then-Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon argued in
the 1930s, present-day opponents argue that corporations will
provide proprietary information to the IRS only if it “stops
with the government.”140
136. See, e.g., John Graham, Jana Raedy & Douglas Shackleford, Research
Accounting for Income Taxes, 53 J. OF ACCT’ING AND ECON. 412. (April 2012).
137. See infra Parts III.B and III.C.
138. TAX EXEC. INST., supra note 22.
139. Id.
140. OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REP. TO CONG. ON
SCOPE AND USE OF TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE 19 (2000).
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Advocates of public disclosure often reject this concern
for several reasons. First, public disclosure opponents have
failed to present concrete examples of the types of corporate
tax return documents that, if publicly disclosed, would expose
proprietary information. Second, public disclosure opponents
present this concern in response to nearly all public disclosure
measures.141 This stance has led to skeptical responses from
advocates of public disclosure, such as “[corporations] have
never been able to articulate how knowing the amount of tax
that a competitor paid reveals anything of competitive
value.”142 Finally, opponents of public disclosure have not ad-
dressed how corporate taxpayers would reduce cooperation
with the IRS in response to the threat of public disclosure of
proprietary information. Despite these weaknesses, however,
as Part III will discuss,143 concern regarding exposure of pro-
prietary information is the only compelling argument
presented by opponents of public disclosure thus far.
II.
CORPORATE TAX PRIVACY AND CORPORATE TAX
AGGRESSIVENESS
Participants in the corporate tax privacy debate have fo-
cused almost exclusively on the potential reactions of a corpo-
ration’s managers, shareholders and consumers to a require-
ment that the corporation publicly disclose its own tax return
information. In contrast to this traditional approach, this Part
examines public disclosure of corporate tax return informa-
tion from the intercorporate perspective: how would the abil-
ity of a corporation’s stakeholders and agents to observe other
corporations’ tax return information affect how the corpora-
tion complies with the tax law?
This Part argues that by keeping certain return informa-
tion from public view, corporate tax privacy may limit the pres-
sure to engage in more aggressive tax planning and reporting
that corporate tax directors face from significant shareholders
and non-tax managers, and even from themselves. It theorizes
how corporate tax privacy provides the government with valua-
ble strategic defenses against increased corporate tax aggres-
141. See, e.g., TAX EXEC. INST., supra note 22.
142. See Pomp, supra note 19, at 439.
143. See infra Part III.A.2.
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siveness by preventing the use of certain corporate tax return
information by interested parties to engage in two specific be-
haviors—benchmarking and reverse engineering—that would
likely cause some tax directors to pursue more aggressive tax
planning and reporting.
A. Sources of Corporate Tax Aggressiveness
Corporate tax directors regularly must make decisions in
the middle of the continuum of potential tax planning oppor-
tunities.144 At one end of the continuum are tax positions that
are clearly legal, such as claiming tax deductions related to the
purchase of software that are specifically authorized by stat-
ute.145 At the other end are tax positions that are clearly ille-
gal, such as claiming tax deductions for phony salary ex-
penses.146 In between these two points are tax positions that
are neither clearly legal nor illegal, but that can instead be
described as “aggressive.” As legal scholars and economists
have often defined it, corporate tax aggressiveness involves the
use of complex transactions that appear to comply with the
literal text of the tax law to obtain tax benefits for the corpora-
tion—tax deductions, tax credits, tax exemptions, lower tax
rates—that Congress did not intend.147
At first glance, corporate tax aggressiveness appears to
cause a number of social harms. From an efficiency stand-
point, it distorts behavior by causing non-tax managers, corpo-
rate tax directors and tax advisors to devote effort to crafting
complex transactions that exploit ambiguities or loopholes in
the tax law rather than engaging in other business activities.148
Second, aggressive corporate tax planning can cause the tax
144. For discussion, see Lewis R. Steinberg, Form, Substance and Directional-
ity in Subchapter C, 52 TAX LAW. 457, 499 (1999); David P. Hariton, Kafka and
the Tax Shelter, 57 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (2003).
145. I.R.C. § 179(d)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
146. Willful failure to pay taxes is a violation of the law. See I.R.C. § 7201
(2012).
147. See, e.g., Frank et al., supra note 25; Logue, supra note 25; Shaviro,
supra note 25. The government has lost high-profile corporate tax abuse
cases at the trial level, only to win them later on appeal, and vice versa. See,
e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001);
United Parcel Service of America v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001);
IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001).
148. As David Weisbach has written, when corporations engage in aggres-
sive tax planning, “[n]o new medicines are found, computer chips designed
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base to shrink unexpectedly, which may cause Congress to in-
crease the tax rates that apply to other taxpayers.149 Third, ag-
gressive corporate tax planning contributes to the complexity
of the tax law as Congress and Treasury must enact anti-abuse
measures in response.150 At the same time, it is not known
whether corporations that engage in aggressive tax planning
use the tax savings to deliver social benefits that outweigh
these costs. Consequently, rather than reach a definitive con-
clusion about the harms of corporate tax aggressiveness, I will
assume, as have many other tax scholars,151 that the govern-
ment should prevent corporations from engaging in transac-
tions that are not consistent with Congress’s intent.
Several stakeholders and agents of a corporation contrib-
ute to its willingness to engage in aggressive tax planning and
reporting:
Tax Directors. One determinant of a corporation’s willing-
ness to pursue aggressive tax strategies is its tax director, the
individual who oversees the corporation’s tax compliance and
reporting obligations.152 Some corporate tax directors are
more willing to engage in aggressive tax planning than
others.153 Conservative tax directors attempt to comply with
or homeless housed . . .”; see David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters,
55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 (2002).
149. See id. at 222.
150. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHEL-
TERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 30 (1999) (stating
“legislative remedies themselves create the complexity”).
151. See, e.g., Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the
Law is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241, 245 n.3 (2007) (deferring discussion
of social and ethical consequences of aggressive tax planning); Sarah B. Law-
sky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017,
1053 n.111 (2009) (assuming “unpaid taxes result in societal harm, which
might not be true”).
152. For discussion of the role of tax director and tax department in tax
planning, see John R. Robinson, Stephanie A. Skies, & Connie D. Weaver, Is
Aggressive Financial and Tax Reporting Related to the Organization and Orientation
of the Corporate Tax Function?, Presentation at the 2006 National Tax Associa-
tion Annual Meeting (Aug. 18, 2006), available at http://www3.nd.edu/
~carecob/Workshops/06-07%20Workshops/Robinson.pdf.
153. See, e.g., Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance,
Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax Shel-
ters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 52 (2001).
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the tax law in a way that is consistent with its spirit.154 Aggres-
sive corporate tax directors, however, treat the IRS as an adver-
sary, engaging in tax planning that applies hyper-literalist
readings of the tax law,155 and revealing as little information to
the IRS as possible.156
Tax Lawyers and Accountants. Related sources of corporate
tax aggressiveness are outside advisors, namely tax lawyers and
accountants. While most tax lawyers are unwilling to deliver
written opinions regarding tax shelters and other aggressive
tax strategies (especially in light of the government’s recent
prosecution of tax lawyers), some are willing to enable aggres-
sive tax planning.157 As has been chronicled at length,158 the
national accounting firms fueled the corporate tax shelter
boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s, where hundreds of
large corporations, including blue chip public companies, pur-
sued highly aggressive tax strategies, with colorful names such
as COBRA (currency options bring reward alternatives),159
PICO (personal income company),160 and Son of BOSS (op-
tion position transfers named after the similar “Bond Option
Sales Strategy” scheme).161 Advisors, thus, can facilitate corpo-
rate tax aggressiveness by designing corporate tax avoidance
strategies and issuing opinions that allow tax directors to im-
plement them.
Non-Tax Management. The non-tax management of a cor-
poration can also influence the level of tax aggressiveness of a
corporation. As several empirical studies have demonstrated,
154. For discussion, see, for example, Claire A. Hill, The Law and Economics
of Identity, 32 QUEEN’S L.J. 389 (2007); Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices:
Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689
(2009).
155. For discussion, see Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward
Tax Shelter Detection, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1629 (2009).
156. See id. at 1655; see also Nanette Byrnes & Louis Lavelle, The Corporate
Tax Game, BUS. WK., Mar. 31, 2003, at 78.
157. See Canellos, supra note 153 (describing tax shelter lawyers as “a dif-
ferent breed, by experience, temperament, reputation, and calling”).
158. See TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES: LAW-
YERS, ACCOUNTANTS AND THE TAX SHELTER CRISIS 53–58 (MIT Press, 2014);
Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES 1775
(1999).
159. I.R.S. Notice 2002-35, 2002-1 C.B. 992.
160. I.R.S. Notice 2002-65, 2002-2 C.B. 690.
161. I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B 255.
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the board of directors, which ultimately answers to sharehold-
ers, can drive managers of the corporation to reduce the cor-
poration’s effective tax rate.162 In response to pressure from
the board of directors or the CEO, the chief financial officer
may prod the tax director to characterize certain tax strategies
as “more likely than not” consistent with U.S. federal tax law in
order to allow their corporations to recognize tax benefits for
financial accounting purposes.163 Depending on the composi-
tion of the audit committee, corporations may also develop a
high tolerance for the risk that the IRS may challenge their tax
positions.164 Some research has even found that personal char-
acter traits of key non-tax managers, such as narcissism, are
positively associated with the tax aggressiveness of their corpo-
rations.165
Shareholders. Non-tax management ultimately can face
pressure from influential shareholder groups, especially invest-
ment funds and banks.166 Over the past decade, activist hedge
funds and private equity funds have purchased sizeable stakes
in publicly traded corporations.167 In many cases, the manag-
ers of these funds strive to maximize the economic return on
their investment in a short period of time.168 In recent years,
162. See John R. Robinson et al., supra note 152 (treatment of tax depart-
ment as profit center by non-tax management contributes to larger book/
tax gap of corporation).
163. See Tanina Rostain, Travails in Tax: KPMG and the Tax-Shelter Contro-
versy, in LEGAL ETHICS: LAW STORIES (Deborah L. Rhode & David J. Luban
eds., 2006) (describing pressure on tax advisors to deliver more-likely-than-
not opinions).
164. See, e.g., Audit Committee Bulletin: October 2013, ERNST & YOUNG (2013),
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Issues/Governance-and-reporting/Audit-Com
mittee/EY-Audit-Committee-Bulletin-October-2013-Call-for-stronger-audit-
committees (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (describing audit committee as devel-
oping “clear articulation of business’s overall tax risk policy”).
165. Kari Joseph Olsen & James Stekelberg, CEO Narcissism and Corporate
Tax Policies (Working Paper Series, Aug. 28, 2014), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446128; see also Bill Francis
et al., Are Female CFOs Less Tax Aggressive? Evidence from Tax Aggressiveness, J.
AMER. TAX’N ASS’N (forthcoming 2014) (investigating the effect of the chief
financial officer’s gender on corporate tax aggressiveness).
166. See, e.g., Mara Der Hovanesian, Attack of the Hungry Hedge Funds, BUS.
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activist hedge funds have played an increasingly visible role in
encouraging the boards and management of publicly traded
corporations to pursue specific tax-motivated transactions.169
These short-term investors benefit if a corporation claims a tax
benefit it can recognize today, even though it may later face a
challenge from the IRS. By the time the corporation engages
in the IRS dispute, the short-term investors may be long
gone.170 Investment fund managers are also often immune to
the professional standards and norms regarding tax planning
that constrain some tax directors and outside advisors.
B. Strategic Defenses Against Corporate Tax Aggressiveness
1. Benchmarking
Tax privacy provides the government with a valuable stra-
tegic defense against increased corporate tax aggressiveness.
As Part III will discuss in depth, public disclosure of complete
corporate tax returns, a position proposed by several public
access advocates, would reveal significant information other-
wise unobservable today about a corporation’s tax planning
and reporting practices.171 By keeping certain corporate tax
return information from public view, corporate tax privacy
prevents interested parties from establishing benchmarks of
aggressiveness in several critical tax compliance areas and
from pressuring tax directors to pursue more aggressive strate-
gies to keep pace with their competitors.
Influential shareholder groups, particularly activist invest-
ment funds, are among the most likely parties to use publicly
available corporate tax return information to apply such pres-
sure. Activist investment funds regularly synthesize informa-
tion about a corporation’s operations and recommend specific
actions.172 In recent years, these funds have delivered detailed
proposals related to tax planning, concerning actions such as
169. See infra notes 189–94 and accompanying text.
170. See Ananth Madhavan, Implementation of Hedge Fund Strategies, in
HEDGE FUND STRATEGIES: A GLOBAL OUTLOOK 74 (Brian R. Bruce ed., 2002).
171. See infra Part III.B.1.
172. See Madhavan, supra note 170; see, e.g., Valeant Pharm. Int’l, Inc., Pro-
spectus (Form 425) (Apr. 23, 2014) (presentation by activist fund Pershing
Square regarding its investment in Valeant Pharmaceuticals and their pro-
posed merger with Allergan).
2014] RECONSIDERING CORPORATE TAX PRIVACY 63
tax-free spin-off transactions173 and corporate inversion merg-
ers.174 With public disclosure, these funds could evaluate their
own corporation’s relative tax aggressiveness in areas such as
transfer pricing, participation in potentially abusive tax strate-
gies, and methods of disclosure of specific questionable trans-
actions to the IRS, among others.175 Access to certain return
information, thus, would provide these funds with newfound
ability to compare their corporations’ tax reporting practices
in specific areas to that of other corporations and to utilize the
information to urge corporations in which they invest to pur-
sue specific aggressive tax strategies.
Similarly, non-tax managers frequently consider tax avoid-
ance strategies that they believe other corporations are pursu-
ing; public access to corporate tax return information would
only increase this comparative analysis. Upon hearing the
news that a major competitor has engaged in aggressive tax
planning to cut its corporate tax bill, some members of a cor-
poration’s board of directors and non-tax management exhibit
a reaction that has been described as “structure envy,”176
meaning that they “demand to know why they don’t have the
same tax savings.”177 With public disclosure, non-tax managers
could analyze tax strategies of competitors, such as by review-
ing specific documents that corporations are required to file
173. See, e.g., Michael J. De La Merced, Hedge Fund Presses Case for Breakup
of Darden Restaurants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2013, 9:03 AM), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/17/hedge-fund-presses-case-for-breakup-of
-darden-restaurants/?php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (describing the cam-
paign by Barington Capital Group to force Darden Restaurants, operator of
the Red Lobster chain, to divide company through spin-offs); Jim Polson,
Hess Files for Tax-Free Spinoff of Gas-Station Network, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 2014,
4:34 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-08/hess-files-papers-
for-tax-free-spinoff-of-gas-station-network.html (describing Hess’ spin-off in
response to the campaign by activist investor Paul Singer).
174. See, e.g., Kasmira Jefford, IHG Shareholder Pushes for Tax Inversion Bid,
CITY A.M. (Aug. 5, 2014, 1:22 AM), http://www.cityam.com/1407198172/
ihg-shareholder-pushes-tax-inversion-bid (describing the campaign by Mar-
cato Capital to force Intercontinental Hotels Group to participate in an in-
version transaction).
175. See infra notes 303–09 and accompanying text.
176. See ERNST & YOUNG, Media Interaction and Reputational Risk: Issues
and Strategies (Feb. 2013).
177. Id.; Robinson et al., supra note 152 (explaining that chief financial
officers who operate the tax department as a profit center encourage “tax
savings to reduce the effective tax rate”).
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with the IRS to enhance its ability to identify potentially abu-
sive tax strategies—such as IRS Form 8886 (Reportable Trans-
action Statement), Schedule UTP (Uncertain Tax Positions),
and others.178 Public disclosure of certain corporate tax return
information, thus, could lead non-tax management to ques-
tion why their own tax director has not pursued more aggres-
sive tax planning.
In addition, without the curtain of corporate tax privacy,
advisors and other third-party groups could use publicly availa-
ble corporate tax return data to aid non-tax corporate manag-
ers and tax directors in establishing and meeting benchmarks
for tax aggressiveness in specific areas of tax planning and
compliance. Each of the “Big Four” accounting firms—KPMG,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, and Ernst & Young—cur-
rently houses a “benchmarking” department.179 These groups
assist corporate clients in measuring their “performance
against best-in-class companies to identify improvement”180 in
a variety of areas, such as executive compensation, inventory
and staffing costs. Notably, the Big Four do not include “tax
planning” among the areas in which they currently deliver
benchmarking services, even though they often advise large
public corporations.181 One explanation for this omission is
that in their engagement letters, these firms explicitly agree
not to disclose any information about their clients’ tax plan-
ning or interactions with the IRS to other clients.182 Depend-
ing on its scope, public disclosure of corporate tax return in-
178. See infra notes 312–28 and accompanying text.
179. See Global Benchmarking Center, DELOITTE, http://www.deloitte.com/
view/en_US/us/Services/consulting/Strategy-Operations/8fc7dc47339972
10VgnVCM200000bb42f00aRCRD.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2014); Benchmark-
ing Performance Metrics, ERNST & YOUNG, http://www.ey.com/US/en/Indus
tries/United-States-sectors/Health-Care/Benchmarking-performance-met
rics (last visited Nov. 5, 2014); Benchmarking, KPMG, http://www.kpmg.com/
gr/en/topics/compensation-benefits-survey/pages/benefits-benchmarking
.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2014); PwC Benchmarking, PRICE-
WATERHOUSECOOPERS, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/benchmarking-services/
index.jhtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
180. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 179.
181. See, e.g., id. (addressing “workforce analytics” and “human resources
services”, but not tax planning).
182. See, e.g., KPMG, GENERAL TERMS OF KPMG FIDUCIAIRE (2011), availa-
ble at https://www.kpmg.com/BE/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublica
tions/Documents/Fiduciaire-general-terms.pdf.
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formation would overcome this contractual obstacle. Other
private firms, such as Audit Analytics, already analyze large
quantities of data in regulatory filings and deliver “peer re-
ports” to clients.183 With publicly available corporate tax re-
turn information, these data analysts could easily deliver simi-
lar services to encourage overly conservative corporate tax di-
rectors to consider alternative tax strategies utilized by their
more aggressive competitors.
Increased pressure from non-tax management and, indi-
rectly, from influential shareholders and third-party advisors
would likely affect the tax reporting and compliance decisions
of corporate tax directors. Faced with detailed information
about the transfer pricing structures of their more aggressive
competitor corporations, for example, some tax directors
would likely explore the use of specific jurisdictions, including
tax havens, or cost-sharing structures that lower their own cor-
poration’s tax burden. As another example, with public access,
corporate tax directors may point to benchmarking reports
from accounting firms or information from other corpora-
tions’ returns to pressure their outside tax lawyers to deliver
written opinions regarding aggressive transactions and strate-
gies, which the law firms had previously declined to issue.184
Public disclosure of corporate tax return information, conse-
quently, could threaten the gatekeeping function that tax law-
yers have traditionally played in advising clients that the most
aggressive tax strategies are not consistent with the tax law.185
Indeed, scholars have criticized the tax lawyers who provided
tax shelter opinions during the late 1990s tax shelter boom, in
response to pressure from corporate tax directors and market
pressures, as abdicating their gatekeeping responsibility.186
Some tax directors may even feel internal pressure to pursue
more aggressive tax planning. As reciprocity studies have con-
firmed,187 actors may reduce their own contributions toward a
183. Audit Analytics Peer Reporter, AUDIT ANALYTICS, http://www.auditana
lytics.com/0002/peer-reporter.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
184. See supra notes 157–61 and accompanying text.
185. For discussion, see Rachelle Y. Holmes, The Tax Lawyer As Gatekeeper,
49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 185, 192–99 (2010).
186. See, e.g., id.; Rostain & Regan, supra note 158, at 70.
187. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and
Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003); Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equal-
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public good if they begin to feel like they are complying with
the law while others avoid or evade it.188
A vivid illustration of the benchmarking effect of publicity
of corporate tax avoidance strategies can be observed in the
inversion transactions of 2013 and 2014, discussed earlier.189
In this transaction, a U.S. corporation would merge with a
non-U.S. company located in a low-tax jurisdiction, such as Ire-
land, where following the merger, the U.S. corporation’s
shareholders retain up to 79.9% of the combined entity’s stock
in the merger.190 After the dust settles, the original sharehold-
ers of the U.S. corporation would retain control of the merged
entity, which would now pay a lower tax rate. As many high
profile consumer-focused public corporations pursued this
strategy in 2014,191 influential shareholder groups met with
the board of directors and management of their own corpora-
tions to argue that they should embrace the strategy as well.192
For example, William Ackman, managing partner of hedge
fund Pershing Square Capital Management, waged a public
campaign to convince the board of Allergan, a U.S. pharma-
ceutical company, in which his fund owned a substantial stake,
to pursue an inversion merger with Valeant, a Canadian phar-
maceutical firm, “in order to get a better tax rate.”193 In meet-
ings with legislators during mid-2014, corporate executives re-
ity Passé? Homo Reciprocans and the Future of Egalitarian Politics, BOS. REV., Oct.
19, 1998, at 4.
188. See Kahan, supra note 187; see, e.g., James Andreoni, Cooperation in
Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or Confusion?, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 891
(1995); Christina M. Fong et al., Strong Reciprocity and the Welfare State, in 2
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY APPLI-
CATIONS 1439, 1447–56 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds.,
2006).
189. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
190. See I.R.C. § 7874(b) (2012). For a description of inversions, see Ed-
ward D. Kleinbard, “Competitiveness” Has Nothing to Do With It, TAX NOTES
(forthcoming 2014).
191. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Ed Hammond, Walgreens Urged to Leave US to Gain Tax Benefit,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014, 7:15 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/55a
76778-c294-11e3-9370-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3GKgV8iRw (describing a
meeting between significant shareholders and Walgreens’ board of directors
regarding proposed inversion transaction).
193. CNBC Transcript: Bill Ackman, Managing Partner, Pershing Square, on
CNBC’s “Fast Money Halftime Report” Today, CNBC (July 21, 2014, 3:13 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101853608#.
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ported that they “might be forced to [invert] too” in order to
match similar moves by competitors.194
Unlike nearly all other corporate tax avoidance tech-
niques that take place behind the curtain of corporate tax pri-
vacy, the corporate inversion strategy occurred in the public
eye. The technique involved a significant business combina-
tion and required corporations to obtain shareholder approval
and disclose the event publicly under securities regulation.195
As one corporate manager commented, when corporate exec-
utives learned of the inversion technique, it began to “snow-
ball.”196 This reaction is consistent with the characterization of
the inversion wave by Ed Kleinbard, a tax law scholar and for-
mer law firm partner, as illustrating “herd behavior,”197 where
“CEOs find it difficult to be the only gazelle on the veldt that
remains in place when all the others madly gallop off in one
direction or another.”198 If all corporate tax returns were pub-
licly accessible, the same types of shareholder groups involved
in inversion campaigns could scour this information in order
to determine whether their own corporations are pursuing
some of the aggressive tax strategies utilized by their competi-
tors. Activist investors could use their considerable resources
to analyze this information and, especially in the case of inno-
vative strategies revealed, pressure management to adopt the
strategies or modified versions.
For another example of benchmarking that can occur as a
result of public disclosure of tax return information, consider
the requirement that tax-exempt organizations publish their
annual tax return, IRS Form 990.199 Managers of non-profit
organizations are acutely aware that donors and watchdog or-
194. Lori Montgomery, U.S. Policymakers Gird for Rash of Corporate Expatria-
tions, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/economy/us-policymakers-gird-for-rash-of-corporate-expatriations/2014/
08/05/4898ca5e-18d9-11e4-9349-84d4a85be981_story.html (quoting CVS
Caremark CEO Larry Merlo).
195. See, e.g., Press Release, Chiquita Brands International, Inc., Chiquita
Brands International, Inc. and Fyffes PLC to Combine to Create Leading
Global Produce Company (Mar. 10, 2014).
196. David Gelles, Health Care Deal Is Latest to Seek Corporate Tax Shelter
Abroad, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2013, 11:36 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/11/06/health-care-deal-is-latest-to-seek-corporate-tax-shelter-abroad/.
197. Kleinbard, supra note 190.
198. Id.
199. See I.R.C. §§ 6033(a), 6104(a) (2012).
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ganizations, such as the Better Business Bureau,200 often scru-
tinize “efficiency ratios” that can be calculated using informa-
tion on certain lines of this form regarding the organizations’
expenses, including fundraising expenses.201 Critics of the re-
quirement that this information be published have argued
that managers of non-profit organizations view the efficiency
ratios of their peer organizations as benchmarks that their own
corporations must meet or surpass.202 Several empirical stud-
ies have found that tax exempt managers engage in “opportu-
nistic cost shifting” by over-reporting expenses related to pro-
gram services and under-reporting those related to fundrais-
ing expenses to avoid generating less attractive efficiency ratios
than those of their peers.203
As this discussion reveals, corporate tax privacy offers a
significant strategic defense against increased corporate tax ag-
gressiveness by restraining the ability of interested parties, es-
pecially influential shareholder groups, to evaluate their own
corporations’ tax avoidance strategies compared to those of
competitor corporations. Further, by preventing both share-
holder groups and tax directors from reviewing the corporate
tax returns of competitors in search of new tax avoidance strat-
200. See, e.g., BBB Wise Giving Alliance, BBB, http://www.bbb.org/us/
charity/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
201. These ratios describe the portion of the organization’s expenses that
are attributable to its charitable purpose and the portion of donations re-
ceived that the organization retains after subtracting its fundraising ex-
penses. For discussion, see Peter Swords et al., How to Read the IRS Form 990
& Find Out What It Means, NONPROFIT COORDINATING COMM. OF N.Y., http://
www.npccny.org/Form_990/990.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
202. See, e.g., CTR. ON NONPROFITS AND PHILANTHROPY, URBAN INST. & CTR.
ON PHILANTHROPY, IND. UNIVERSITY, The Pros and Cons of Financial Efficiency
Standards, in POLICY BRIEFS: NONPROFIT OVERHEAD COST PROJECT (2004),
available at http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/kbfiles/521/brief%205.pdf.
203. Ranjani Krishnan, Michelle H. Yetman & Robert J. Yetman, Financial
Disclosure Management by Nonprofit Organizations (Working Paper, 2002), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=319581; see also
Ranjani Krishnan, Michelle H. Yetman & Robert J. Yetman, Expense Misre-
porting in Nonprofit Organizations, 81 ACCT. REV. 399 (2006) (finding zero fun-
draising expense reporting by certain tax-exempt organizations due to inap-
propriate reporting); Elizabeth K. Keating et al., Misreporting Fundraising:
How Do Nonprofit Organizations Account for Telemarketing Campaigns?, 83 ACCT.
REV. 417 (2008).
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egies, corporate tax privacy inhibits innovation in corporate
tax aggressiveness.204
2. Reverse Engineering
Corporate tax privacy also restricts the ability of sophisti-
cated advisors and, ultimately, tax directors to observe docu-
ments that would allow them to better predict the likelihood
of certain IRS enforcement actions. The IRS engages in cat-
and-mouse dynamics with corporate taxpayers that have the
upper hand in designing and concealing tax avoidance strate-
gies.205 When viewed in large quantities over extended periods
of time, certain publicly available corporate tax return infor-
mation would enable sophisticated analysts to identify the
types of tax positions that have the greatest probability of re-
sulting in challenges from the IRS. Corporate tax directors
would likely respond to this analysis by adjusting their own cor-
poration’s tax reporting and planning behavior.
With complete public access, tax advisors and corporate
tax directors would observe documents that would reveal the
responses of the IRS to the reported tax positions of their com-
petitors, information not otherwise observable today, absent
the rare case of litigation. Part III will describe in detail the
specific corporate tax return documents that would allow for
reverse engineering—such as IRS Form 5701 (Notice of Pro-
posed Adjustment), IRS Form 870 (Waiver of Restrictions on
Assessment) and IRS Form 4549 (Income Tax Discrepancy Ad-
justments)—which describe the IRS’s settlements with corpo-
rate taxpayers and assertion of tax penalties.206 Such informa-
tion could lead some corporate tax directors to avoid certain
strategies that are likely to draw IRS attention, while other in-
formation could encourage some corporate tax directors to
adopt the more aggressive actions of their competitor corpora-
204. The IRS, by contrast, should engage in explanation by issuing revenue
rulings and other published guidance that provide clarity where it is needed.
See I.R.S. Summary of the Published Guidance Process, IRM 32.2.2 (Sept. 16,
2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part32/irm_32-002-002.html
(describing revenue rulings as “provid[ing] an orderly system for dissemina-
tion of information and promot[ing] effective communication with the tax
community”).
205. For discussion, see Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax
Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1950 (2005).
206. See infra notes 332–41 and accompanying text.
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tions that do not appear to have resulted in challenges from
the IRS.
More importantly, with complete public access, tax advi-
sory and data analysis firms would have the ability to conduct
empirical analysis, which would reveal, using quantitative
rather than anecdotal methods, the types of tax positions and
filing actions that are most statistically likely to result in detec-
tion and challenge by the IRS.207 Especially in light of the in-
creased focus on aggressiveness by investors and non-tax man-
agers that would likely result from public disclosure of corpo-
rate tax returns, tax directors could exhibit demand for
predictive models in the corporate tax enforcement context.
The major accounting firms and other advisory firms that con-
duct quantitative analysis would have strong economic incen-
tives to use publicly available corporate tax return data to cre-
ate statistical models that could predict whether certain tax re-
porting and filing actions in different circumstances would
result in the government’s use of audits, deficiency assertions
and tax penalties. Currently, the major accounting firms do
not advertise their use of such statistical models to clients.208
One plausible reason for this absence is that these firms are
reluctant to advertise that they use their clients’ return and
audit information to develop a model that can benefit their
competitors, a result, which is potentially addressed by the
broad terms of engagement letters.209 Another possibility is
that in the wake of the government’s recent crackdown on tax
shelter activity by the Big Four, the managers of these firms are
reluctant to advertise that they have developed models that en-
able clients to avoid detection and challenge by the IRS.210
Public disclosure of complete corporate tax return informa-
tion would provide these firms with the ability to advertise sta-
tistical modeling openly. And the Big Four would likely face
market pressure to develop such models, given that public dis-
207. See id.
208. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 179.
209. See, e.g., KPMG, GENERAL TERMS OF KPMG FIDUCIAIRE (2011), supra
note 182 (“KPMG . . . shall treat all information provided to it either prior to
or in the course of delivering the Services as confidential . . .”).
210. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, KPMG Developed New Version of Tax Shelter
I.R.S. Had Disallowed, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/08/26/business/kpmg-developed-new-version-of-tax-shelter-irs-had-
disallowed.html (describing “broad crackdown”).
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closure would invite competition from data analysis groups,
such as Audit Analytics, which do not offer tax advisory ser-
vices currently.211
To visualize the possible empirical analysis that public ac-
cess would allow, consider empirical studies of judicial deci-
sion-making.212 As one example, in prior work, Nancy Staudt
and I reviewed all corporate tax abuse cases decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court between 1909 and 2011, along with the
underlying briefs filed by government lawyers.213 We coded
the data to identify independent variables related to the facts
of the case (e.g., whether the transaction involved a third
party), procedural aspects of the taxpayer’s return (e.g.,
whether the controversy arose as a result of the taxpayer’s re-
quest for a refund), and external factors (e.g., whether the
economy was expanding, whether the national defense spend-
ing was increasing).214 We then applied a probit model to de-
termine how these factors affected the dependent variable—
the judicial outcome—in the corporate tax abuse cases.215
Others have conducted studies that examine whether certain
attributes of judges, such as political preferences and family
status, influence judges’ decisions in specific types of cases.216
For-profit vendors have historically attempted to reverse-
engineer the IRS’s approach to auditing tax returns outside of
the corporate tax context. For example, every year, IRS com-
puters assign a Discriminant Function System (DIF) score to
211. See AUDIT ANALYTICS, supra note 183.
212. See, e.g., Theodore Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project:
Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1183, 1188–89 (2004) (showing that in some cir-
cumstances, scientific models outperform individual experts); see also John S.
Summers & Michael J. Newman, Towards a Better Measure of Understanding of
U.S. Supreme Court Review of Courts of Appeals Decisions, 80 U.S.L.W. 393, 394
(2011).
213. Joshua D. Blank & Nancy Staudt, Corporate Shams, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1641 (2012).
214. See id., at 1667–68.
215. See id., at 1684 tbl. 3; 1696 tbl. 4.
216. See, e.g., Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, The Ideologi-
cal Component of Judging in the Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797,
1815–21 (2006); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point
Estimation Via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999,
10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002); Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie
with Judicial Votes: Misconceptions, Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
813 (2010).
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individual tax returns, which identifies whether reviews of the
tax returns are likely to result in a change, based on the IRS’s
past experience with similar tax returns.217 The factors that
the IRS uses to calculate the DIF score are not public.218 Nev-
ertheless, tax preparation software firms, such as TurboTax,
have attempted to use information collected from their cus-
tomers to reverse-engineer the DIF score in order to predict
whether a taxpayer’s return will result in an audit.219 When an
individual uses TurboTax after completing a tax return, the
software’s “Audit Risk Meter” reviews the return and indicates
whether the probability of an IRS audit is high or low.220 (In-
tuit, the owner of TurboTax, has developed the model by us-
ing customers’ return and audit information, after securing
their permission in its terms of service.)221 Public disclosure of
complete corporate tax returns, including those that reveal en-
forcement actions of the IRS, would likewise enable both re-
searchers and profit-motivated tax advisors to devise similar
statistical models.
Given its limited enforcement resources, the IRS must
make tactical decisions regarding which potentially abusive tax
positions to challenge.222 By offering corporations and their
advisors, which do not face such resource limitations, a win-
dow into these tactical decisions, public disclosure of complete
217. See I.R.S., The Examination (Audit) Process, FS-2006-10, Jan. 2006,
available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Examination-(Audit)-Process
(describing DIF score).
218. See I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2) (2012). Recently, George Yin has argued that
disclosure of “algorithms developed by the agency to identify cases deserving
greater scrutiny” would “harm tax administration.” George K. Yin, The Most
Critical Issue Facing Tax Administration Today—And What to Do About It (Va.
Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2014-11, 2014), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459592.
219. See Top Five Ways to Avoid a Tax Audit, INTUIT TURBO TAX, https://
turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tools/tax-tips/Tax-Planning-and-Checklists/Top-
Five-Ways-to-Avoid-a-Tax-Audit/INF19031.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
220. Id.
221. TurboTax’s Audit Risk Meter is created “from usage data from 20
million tax filers.” Bruce Upbin, How Intuit Uses Big Data for the Little Guy,
FORBES (April 26, 2012, 8:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
bruceupbin/2012/04/26/how-intuit-uses-big-data-for-the-little-guy/.
222. See IRS OVERSIGHT BD., supra note 98; Press Release, U.S. Senate
Comm. on Finance, IRS Budget Cut Translates to Huge Tax Loss (May 22,
2006).
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corporate tax returns would further hinder the IRS’s efforts to
detect and challenge aggressive corporate tax strategies.
C. Current Knowledge
A potential objection to this analysis is that significant
shareholders, non-tax management, tax advisors and tax direc-
tors already possess sufficient knowledge of corporate tax af-
fairs necessary to engage in benchmarking and reverse engi-
neering.223 Mandated public disclosure, some may respond,
would do little to encourage additional benchmarking or re-
verse engineering. This objection is unpersuasive for several
reasons.
First, while significant investors may have greater access to
corporate management and may even be able to learn about
the tax affairs of corporations in which they invest, the curtain
of tax privacy prevents them from performing comparative
analysis on both a macro and micro level. As Part I illustrated,
a tremendous amount of a U.S. multinational corporation’s
tax information, including the amount of U.S. taxable income
and cash taxes paid to the U.S., is not observable in SEC fil-
ings.224 Under current law, shareholders who own one-percent
or more of the outstanding stock of a corporation are entitled
to inspect the corporation’s tax return.225 While the largest ac-
tivist hedge funds may meet this threshold, they still cannot
access the corporate tax returns of all corporations,226 includ-
ing competitors of corporations in which they invest, without
meeting the required ownership threshold. Consequently,
even investment funds and institutional investors with posi-
tions in blue chip corporations are not able to conduct com-
parisons from the intercorporate perspective.
Second, even though investors, corporate tax directors
and advisors may be aware of the tax activities of some of their
competitors, this knowledge is based on anecdotal rather than
statistical evidence. The lack of access to complete corporate
tax return data, consequently, prevents investors from estab-
lishing reliable benchmarks. Without access to documents that
223. See, e.g., Lee Sheppard, Should Corporate Tax Returns Be Disclosed?, 142
TAX NOTES 1381, 1382 (2014).
224. See supra Part I.B.
225. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1)(D)(iii) (2012).
226. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (2012).
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reveal IRS actions in corporate tax deficiency disputes across
an extended period of time, sophisticated analysts possess a
limited ability to reverse-engineer the IRS’s approach to corpo-
rate tax enforcement in specific compliance areas. A relevant
analogy from another tax context can be found in the limited
ability of tax lawyers to view U.S. Tax Court filings of other
lawyers, especially those representing the IRS, in an easily ac-
cessible online format.227 As one practitioner has asserted in
favor of gaining electronic access to these filings, “it would be
great for practitioners representing taxpayers to see how the
government argues their positions . . . .”228 Statements like
these illustrate that even experienced tax lawyers desire access
to data that would allow them to better predict dispute resolu-
tion decisions of the IRS.
Third, even if corporate tax directors are aware that ag-
gressive tax strategies are “percolating,”229 whether pitched by
promoters or developed by in-house tax lawyers and account-
ants, they do not necessarily know the identity of the corpora-
tions that are pursuing specific tax avoidance techniques. As
behavioral researchers have demonstrated, individuals are
highly influenced by their perceptions of the acts of the “other
members of [their] in-group[s].”230 Without public access,
however, critical information about the tax activities of a tax
director’s competitors, which might encourage benchmarking
and increased aggressive tax planning, is not visible.
Finally, while some large public corporations engage with
common advisors, such as the Big Four accounting firms, these
advisors, as has been discussed,231 are contractually bound by
their own engagement letters not to disclose the details of
their clients’ corporate tax returns or ongoing IRS audits to
other corporations.232 And at the largest multinational corpo-
rations, some tax avoidance strategies are “homegrown”: the
product of a single in-house tax department, consisting of doz-
227. See William R. Davis, Limits to Tax Court Online Access Thwart Practition-
ers, 144 TAX NOTES 1124 (2014).
228. Id.
229. Sheppard, supra note 223 (quoting Reuven Avi-Yonah.).
230. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS
MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 144 (2010).
231. See supra notes 181–82.
232. See, e.g., KPMG, GENERAL TERMS OF KPMG FIDUCIAIRE (2011), supra
note 182.
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ens of tax accountants and lawyers, rather than a Big Four ac-
counting firm.233
III.
WHAT CORPORATE TAX RETURN INFORMATION
SHOULD BE PUBLIC?
A significant and previously unexplored risk of excessive
public disclosure of corporate tax return information is that it
could encourage, rather than limit, aggressive corporate tax
planning. Is the implication of this analysis that all corporate
tax return information should remain hidden from public
view? As this Part argues, the answer is no. The strategic de-
fenses of corporate tax privacy are not the only factors that
policymakers should take into account. This Part offers three
guiding principles that policymakers should consider when
evaluating proposals to make all or part of corporate tax re-
turn information public. It then applies the principles to a va-
riety of specific public disclosure measures that have been the
subject of both historic and current debate. This Part con-
cludes by presenting categories of return information that
should not be, and that should be, public.
A. Guiding Principles
Rather than engage in sweeping “public vs. private” de-
bates over disclosure of corporate tax return information,234
policymakers should consider several factors when deciding
whether to support proposals to make corporations’ tax return
information publicly accessible. As Part I argued, policymakers
should disregard as unpersuasive two traditional arguments in
favor of public disclosure—that it would increase the IRS’s de-
tection capabilities and achieve deterrence with the threat of
public shaming—and two common objections to public disclo-
233. For further discussion, see Blank, supra note 107.
234. See, e.g., Salmon, supra note 14; EDITORIAL BD. OF BLOOMBERG VIEW,
supra note 14; Allan Sloan, Hey Corporate America: Show Us Your Tax Returns,
FORTUNE (Nov. 17, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2011/11/17/hey-
corporate-america-show-us-your-tax-returns/. For discussion of similar all-or-
nothing dynamics in the debate over consumer product disclosure, see Ryan
Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 MICH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (describing “disclosurism” and “antidisclosur-
ism”).
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sure, namely, that it would violate equity principles and result
in information overload.235 In contrast, I argue that policy-
makers should consider how each proposal is likely to affect
the strategic defenses of corporate tax privacy, exposure of
proprietary information and the quality of public awareness
and debate of corporate tax issues. Each of these factors is de-
scribed below.
1. Would Public Disclosure Diminish Strategic Defenses of
Corporate Tax Privacy?
Policymakers should consider the potential effect of each
corporate tax return public disclosure proposal at issue on the
strategic defenses of corporate tax privacy. As has been dis-
cussed, corporate tax privacy provides the government with
two valuable strategic defenses against corporate tax aggres-
siveness by restraining the ability of a corporation’s stakehold-
ers and agents to engage in benchmarking and reverse engi-
neering.236 Rather than address this concern in the abstract,
this Part presents concrete examples of how public exposure
of certain return information would be most likely to diminish
the strategic defenses of corporate tax privacy.237
Some public disclosure advocates may object that by au-
thorizing the government to withhold from the public infor-
mation about the tax strategies used by specific corporate tax-
payers, as well as information about specific enforcement ac-
tions of the IRS, policymakers would disregard the democratic
value of transparency. Without transparency, citizens may be
unable to debate and question the government’s actions and
hold it accountable.238 There are several responses to this con-
cern.
First, the government can still preserve transparency by
releasing statistical data regarding its corporate tax enforce-
ment practices without providing enough detail about specific
named corporations to enable benchmarking and reverse en-
gineering. As an example, the IRS annually publishes its “Data
235. See infra Part I.C.
236. See infra Part II.B.
237. See id.
238. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14–15 (rev. ed. 1999).
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Book,” which provides aggregate statistics regarding corporate
taxpayers’ audit rates, tax penalties and taxes paid.239
Second, policymakers should provide a direct explanation
for retaining tax privacy protections for corporate tax return
information, whether it relates to tax enforcement or some
other concern.240 For example, to preempt objections that the
government is not acting transparently, the Treasury Depart-
ment could describe such a rationale in the preamble to regu-
lations that address the type of corporate tax return informa-
tion that is subject to mandatory public disclosure.
Finally, the government should maintain institutions that
oversee the operation of the IRS and report their findings to
the public. Under current law, this oversight is provided by
several bodies, including the Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration,241 the IRS Oversight Board,242 and Con-
gress itself.243
2. Would Public Disclosure Expose Proprietary Information?
Policymakers should also consider the potential exposure
of a corporation’s proprietary information when evaluating
public disclosure measures. Significant flaws in the traditional
articulation of this concern are that public disclosure oppo-
nents have neither offered examples of tax return documents
that contain this information nor illustrated why exposure of
this information would diminish voluntary compliance.244 In
contrast, this Subpart argues that several unintended adverse
consequences could result if policymakers embraced a public
239. See I.R.S. Data Book, 2012, Pub. 55B (2013), available at http://
www.irs. gov/pub/irs-soi/12databk.pdf.
240. For example, government officials have commented publicly that
they deliberately litigate cases involving high-profile taxpayers to deter indi-
vidual tax noncompliance and enhance taxpayer confidence. See Kristen A.
Parillo, Korb: Tax Press Plays Key Role in IRS Communications Strategy, 118 TAX
NOTES 478, 478–79 (2008) (quoting former IRS Chief Counsel Donald
Korb).
241. See TREAS. INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., About TIGTA, U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/about.shtml#2 (last
visited Nov. 5, 2014).
242. See IRS Oversight Board, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, http://
www.treasury.gov/irsob/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
243. See I.R.C. § 6103(f) (2012).
244. See supra notes 141–43.
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disclosure measure without considering the possibility that it
would expose proprietary information.
Before proceeding, a definition of “proprietary” informa-
tion is necessary. One possibility is that it is information that is
(1) economically valuable, (2) subject to reasonable measures
by the corporation to keep it secret, and (3) not readily obtain-
able from public sources. This definition is derived from em-
ployment law.245 Regardless of its source, the key point is that
proprietary information in the corporate tax context is that
which has economic value because its disclosure could harm
the corporation or benefit a competitor.246 As this Part will il-
lustrate, some corporate tax return documents indeed contain
sensitive information about the inner workings of a corpora-
tion that is not otherwise publicly available. Certain tax forms,
for example, reveal a corporation’s business structure, trading
strategy, compensation of high-level employees, and research
expenditures.247 At the same time, other tax return informa-
tion, such as the aggregate amount of tax paid to the U.S. gov-
ernment in a particular tax year, does not reveal proprietary
information.248
An adverse consequence that could result from public dis-
closure of a corporation’s proprietary information is that some
tax directors may reduce the quality and quantity of disclosure
they make to the IRS regarding specific expenses and transac-
tions if they perceive that competitors would benefit from
viewing this information. Corporate tax directors regularly use
their discretion in revealing information to the IRS regarding
certain tax positions and transactions, through submissions
such as reportable transaction forms, Schedule UTP, and doz-
ens of other forms.249 In addition, tax directors often volunta-
rily provide written explanations of certain deductions and
other items.250 In these cases, where tax directors can apply
their own judgment regarding the amount of detail to provide
245. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 8.02 (Tentative Draft No.
4, 2011); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
246. For further discussion, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW 69
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2011).
247. See infra notes 342–45.
248. See infra notes 419–22.
249. See infra notes 312–28 and accompanying text.
250. See, e.g. I.R.S Instructions for Form 1120, at 3 (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120.pdf.
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to the IRS, a public disclosure regime could cause some corpo-
rations to withhold details regarding transactions and ex-
penses that would benefit competitors if exposed. The result-
ing harm is that reduced voluntary disclosure would further
strain tax enforcement resources, as IRS agents would now
need to seek information that corporations would otherwise
offer to them.
Another adverse consequence of public disclosure is that
where corporate managers have little or no ability to avoid dis-
closing information to the IRS, exposure of proprietary infor-
mation would disadvantage U.S. publicly traded corporations
compared to other U.S. and non-U.S. legal entities. For exam-
ple, as some public disclosure measures would require corpo-
rations to reveal publicly their complete organizational struc-
ture, trades of portfolio investments, compensation of many of
their most valuable employees, and future business plans re-
garding their intellectual property, these measures would
cause corporations to face a competitive obstacle compared to
other business organizations.251 This disadvantage is not con-
sistent with any of the stated rationales underlying arguments
in favor of public disclosure of corporate tax return informa-
tion, or the corporate income tax itself.252 No one has argued,
for instance, that an objective of public disclosure is to reduce
a corporation’s ability to succeed in pursuing profit-maximiz-
ing business strategies unrelated to tax planning.253 Yet with-
out some limitation, public disclosure of certain corporate tax
return information could have this unintended effect.
A frequent response to the proprietary information con-
cern is that public disclosure would “create a level playing
field”254 among corporations. However, unless policymakers
apply the public disclosure measure to all businesses operated
through other legal entities, such as closely held corporations,
partnerships, and limited liability corporations, public access
could place U.S. publicly traded corporations at a significant
disadvantage by requiring only these corporations to reveal
their proprietary information to others.255 Even if the U.S. fed-
251. See infra notes 342–45, 401–07.
252. See supra Part I.C.1.
253. See id.
254. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 18.
255. See I.R.C. § 6103 (2012).
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eral government could publish the tax returns of all U.S. enti-
ties, it still would not eliminate the disadvantage these entities
would face compared to competitors outside the United States
that would not be required to reveal proprietary information.
3. Would Public Disclosure Enhance Public Awareness and
Debate?
Finally, policymakers should consider the potential effects
of each measure on public awareness and debate of corporate
tax issues. An informed public is an essential element of de-
mocracy.256 While proponents of public interest, public choice
and other theories differ on the motivations underlying the
legislative process,257 public awareness and debate of specific
tax issues can motivate legislators to act.258 One of the ratio-
nales for making corporate tax return information public,
therefore, should be that this disclosure would result in a bet-
ter informed public, aided by the news media and empirical
research, which in turn, could have the positive effect of en-
couraging legislators to debate and seek legislative change.
As behavioral research has long shown, specific examples
can have a more profound effect on individuals’ perceptions
than anonymous statistics.259 Specific examples include a
description of the identifying traits of a person or thing, which
may include a name, occupation or physical features.260 The
name “Apple,” for instance, is more likely to trigger a memora-
ble image than the term “consumer electronics corporation.”
256. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Yancey (Jan. 6,
1816), in 11 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 493, 497 (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., 1905) (“If a Nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civiliza-
tion, it expects what never was and never will be.”).
257. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); see also GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF
BUREAUCRACY (1965).
258. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study
of the Legislative Process by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1990).
259. See generally STEPHEN M. KOSSLYN ET AL., THE CASE FOR MENTAL IM-
AGERY 3–23 (2006); Stephen M. Kosslyn & William L. Thompson, When Is
Early Visual Cortex Activated During Visual Mental Imagery?, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL.
723 (2003).
260. See Phillip J. Mazzocco & Timothy C. Brock, Understanding the Role of
Mental Imagery in Persuasion: A Cognitive Resources Model Analysis, in CREATING
IMAGES AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MARKETING COMMUNICATION 65–79 (2006).
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Cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that specific exam-
ples cause individuals to create mental images, which, in turn,
can help them understand concepts or arguments.261 Neuros-
cientists have even shown that brain activity is affected by the
vividness of a specific example of a person or thing.262 For this
reason, as Daniel Levin and I have shown in prior empirical
analysis, as April 15th, the filing deadline for U.S. individual
tax returns, nears, the government creates memorable images
of tax enforcement by disproportionately publicizing specific
examples of individuals who have been convicted of tax of-
fenses.263
Similarly, past tax reform experiences in the United States
illustrate that tax issues, including those involving corpora-
tions, can attract significant public interest and lead to legisla-
tive change when the public learns about them through the
vehicle of specific examples of named corporations. The 1980s
are a storied period in American tax history, when Congress
generated enough bipartisan legislative support to enact multi-
ple major pieces of tax legislation, including the landmark Tax
Reform Act of 1986.264 During this period, Congress enacted
major changes to the corporate tax law, including the repeal
261. See, e.g., Nick Ellis, Word Meaning and the Links Between the Verbal System
and Modalities of Perception and Imagery, in MENTAL IMAGES IN HUMAN CONDI-
TION 313 (1991).
262. See K.M. O’Craven & N. Kanwisher, Mental Imagery of Faces and Places
Activates Corresponding Stimulus-Specific Brain Regions, 126 J. COG. NEUROS-
CIENCE 1013, 1013–23 (2000).
263. See Joshua D. Blank & Daniel Z. Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publi-
cized?, 30 VA. TAX REV. 1, 8 (2010). For the time window from April 1 to April
15, we found that the government issued 128% more tax-enforcement press
releases per week than during the rest of the year. Id. at 16. The p-value was
only .0000013, meaning a one in 791,637 chance of randomness. Id.
264. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Tax Eq-
uity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324;
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172; Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
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of General Utilities265 and a number of significant base-broaden-
ing measures.266
Commentators have cited public awareness of specific ex-
amples of corporate tax avoidance as having a significant im-
pact on Congress’s decision to act on tax legislation during
this period.267 In the years immediately preceding the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, Citizens for Tax Justice, an advocacy group,
published a list of major corporations that had paid no income
tax as a result of safe harbor leasing and other tax planning
techniques.268 As one scholar has characterized it, this revela-
tion had a “profound effect on educating the public and on
shaping public opinion.”269
Public access to corporate tax return information could
provide even more vivid examples of the tax affairs of house-
hold name corporations. If public awareness of corporate tax
issues grows significantly as a result of the many specific exam-
ples that the media would publicize following the release of
corporate tax returns, some members of Congress could pur-
sue corporate tax legislation and reform more aggressively. In
rejecting the pure public choice theory explanation of the
events that led to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, Dan Shaviro has argued that, in response to public out-
cry, members of Congress proposed and enacted legislation as
“a means of symbolic communication with members of the
265. Prior to 1986, corporations could distribute appreciated property to
shareholders without recognizing corporate-level gain. See Gen. Utils. & Op-
erating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). In 1986, Congress overruled
the General Utilities doctrine by enacting a statute that required corporations
to recognize gain on the distribution of appreciated property. See I.R.C.
§ 311(b) (2012).
266. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
267. See, e.g., Richard Pomp, State Tax Expenditure Budgets—And Beyond, in
THE UNFINISHED AGENDA FOR STATE TAX REFORM 74 (1988).
268. CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, CORPORATE INCOME TAXES IN THE REAGAN
YEARS (1984); CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, CORPORATE TAXPAYERS & CORPO-
RATE FREELOADERS (1985); CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, MONEY FOR NOTHING:
THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE TAX INCENTIVES, 1981–1984 (1986); CITIZENS
FOR TAX JUSTICE, 130 REASONS WHY WE NEED TAX REFORM (1986).
269. Pomp, supra note 19, at 375. According to former Treasury Secretary
Donald Regan, when he reported to President Reagan that “your secretary
paid more in federal taxes last year than General Electric, Boeing, General
Dynamics, and 57 other big corporations,” President Reagan responded by
focusing attention on corporate tax reform. DONALD T. REGAN, FOR THE RE-
CORD: FROM WALL STREET TO WASHINGTON 194 (1989).
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general public” and “as a means of exercising and demonstrat-
ing one’s power.”270 For a more recent example, consider the
reaction from politicians to the publicly observable examples
of multi-billion dollar corporate inversion transactions in
2014.271 The flurry of media attention surrounding this tax
avoidance strategy appeared to stimulate national politicians
to pursue measures ranging from targeted anti-inversion stat-
utes to a comprehensive overhaul of U.S. international tax
rules.272 Common features of these examples (from both the
1980s and today) are that they involved specific corporations
and tax issues that were easy to understand (e.g., expatriation,
zero effective tax rate, etc.).
Targeted public disclosure proposals could enable the
public to learn fundamental information about a corpora-
tion’s tax affairs that is otherwise unobservable today. Specifi-
cally, public access could enable the media to publicize a large
multinational U.S. corporation’s federal tax liability (for tax,
not GAAP purposes) each year, the amount of cash taxes it
270. Shaviro, supra note 258, at 9.
271. See supra notes 189–94 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., Katie Zezima, Obama: Tax Loophole that Allows Companies to
Leave the U.S. Is ‘Unpatriotic,’ WASH. POST (July 24, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/07/24/obama-tax-
loophole-that-allows-companies-to-leave-the-u-s-is-unpatriotic/ (quoting Pres-
ident Obama). In September 2014, the Treasury Department issued pro-
posed regulations that contain a number of provisions designed to limit the
economic benefits of tax-motivated inversion transactions. See I.R.S. Notice
2014-52. This example illustrates the difficulty that the government faces in
responding to increased use of new tax avoidance strategies. First, the new
proposed regulations are not retroactive, which helps explain why certain
tax avoidance strategies “snowball”—as corporations expect that the govern-
ment may attempt to counteract the new strategy, many rush to engage in
the strategy before the announcement of preventative rules. Second, the
ability of the government to stem the flourishing avoidance strategy is con-
strained as a result of the Treasury’s limited legal authority. The proposed
regulations, for instance, lack rules regarding tax deductible interest pay-
ments from U.S. corporations to foreign parents following the inversion
merger, causing some commentators to describe the regulations as “modest”
and “tepid.” See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Treasury Takes a Modest Step on Inver-
sions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2014, 6:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/09/23/treasury-takes-a-modest-step-on-inversions/?r=0; Richard Rubin
et al., Pfizer Seeking Inversions Shows Companies Unfazed by Lew, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 24, 2014, 10:27 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-24/
pfizer-pursuing-inversions-shows-companies-undeterred-by-lew.html (quot-
ing Bret Wells).
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paid to the U.S. government and the amount of tax it owed
and paid to governments other than the U.S. federal govern-
ment.273 In addition, public access would enable the public to
learn about the extent to which the U.S. government subsi-
dized the corporation’s payment of taxes to non-U.S. govern-
ments through the foreign tax credit.274
Depending on the scope of the proposal, public access
could also enable the media to raise public awareness of cor-
porate “tax expenditures,” where Congress essentially embeds
spending provisions in the tax law, by describing named cor-
porations who have used them to reduce their U.S. tax liabil-
ity. In 2011, for example, U.S. corporations utilized tax expen-
diture provisions that cost the U.S. government over $180 bil-
lion.275 As the General Accounting Office reported in 2013,
this foregone tax revenue resulted from the dozens of tax ex-
penditure provisions that corporations utilize each year.276
Some of these tax expenditures account for a large portion of
the foregone revenue, namely accelerated depreciation and
deferral of income from controlled foreign corporations.277
Others involve much more obscure tax issues such as the tax
credit that certain corporations receive when they produce
barrels of non-conventional fuel sources or when they produce
agri-biodiesel fuel.278 It is often difficult to determine which
corporations benefit from certain corporate tax expenditures
simply by reviewing the statutory language and legislative his-
tory.279 Public access to certain corporate tax return informa-
tion could raise public awareness of these expenditures and
encourage members of Congress to review their performance
more regularly.
273. See I.R.S. Form 1120, ll. 30–36 (2013), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120.pdf
274. See I.R.S. Form 1118 (Rev. Dec. 2013), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1118.pdf
275. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-339, CORPORATE TAX EX-
PENDITURES: INFORMATION ON ESTIMATED REVENUE LOSSES AND RELATED FED-
ERAL SPENDING PROGRAMS (2013).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 11.
278. Id. at 30.
279. See, e.g., CITIZENS AGAINST GOVERNMENT WASTE, 2012 CONGRESSIONAL
PIG BOOK (2012).
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Reporters, politicians and advocacy groups often attempt
to utilize the little corporate tax information that is publicly
available to reveal the tax affairs of well-known U.S. corpora-
tions.280 These attempts frequently result in inaccurate state-
ments about a corporation’s tax positions.281 In addition, the
limited data available today causes the public to pay attention
to corporations that are reported to pay no, or nearly no, an-
nual tax to the U.S. government282 rather than on other cor-
porations that have engaged in aggressive tax planning to re-
duce an otherwise high global effective tax rate.283 Public ac-
cess to certain corporate tax return information could enable
both nonpartisan research institutions284 and tax advocacy
groups285 to conduct more sophisticated empirical analysis of
specific corporations’ tax affairs, such as their use of tax ex-
penditure provisions and international tax treaty provisions to
avoid U.S. taxation. If properly designed, public access to cor-
porate tax return information could result in greater clarity in
public discussions of corporate tax issues.
280. See, e.g., Tim Worstall, Bloomberg’s Getting in a Mess with This Apple
Taxes Story, FORBES (May 30, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
timworstall/2013/05/30/bloombergs-getting-in-a-mess-with-this-apple-taxes-
story/; Elizabeth MacDonald, NY Times Gets Apple’s Effective Tax Rate Wrong,
FOX BUSINESS (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/
2012/04/30/did-new-york-times-get-apples-effective-tax-rate-wrong/.
281. For instance, in 2010, British Petroleum created a $20 billion fund to
compensate individuals and businesses that suffered harm as a result of its
Gulf of Mexico oil spill. When British Petroleum revealed that it would claim
these amounts as a tax deduction and use the deduction to offset taxable
income from a prior year, the mainstream media and the general public
characterized British Petroleum as though it had engaged in an abusive tax
shelter transaction. See, e.g., Jia Lynn Yang, BP to Cut Its U.S. Tax Bill by $10
Billion, WASH. POST, July 28, 2010, at A4. The tax position of British Petro-
leum, however, was clearly intended by Congress. See I.R.C. §§ 165, 172
(2012).
282. See, e.g., CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, THE SORRY STATE OF CORPORATE
TAXES (2014), available at http://ctj.org/corporatetaxdodgers/.
283. See Shaviro, supra note 258, at 60.
284. See, e.g., About Us, THE TAX FOUND., http://taxfoundation.org/about-
us (last visited Nov. 5, 2014); About Us, TAX POLICY CTR., http://
www.taxpolicy center.org/aboutus/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
285. See, e.g., Background and History, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, http://
ctj.org/about/background.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2014); Who We Are, TAX
JUSTICE NETWORK, http://www.taxjustice.net/about/ (last visited Nov. 5,
2014).
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* * *
How should policymakers take these three guiding princi-
ples into account when evaluating specific public disclosure
measures? One approach would be to place dollar values on
the costs and benefits of public disclosure, using the principles
presented above. While cost-benefit analysis is a tool that the
government has utilized when analyzing health, environmen-
tal, and safety regulations,286 it is unlikely to be useful in this
context. Some of the costs, such as lost tax revenue due to in-
creased use of certain aggressive tax strategies, may be measur-
able over time. Yet other costs (such as advantages to business
competitors or harm to the IRS’s enforcement efforts) and
benefits (such as increased public debate) may not be quantifi-
able even with simplifying assumptions.
Instead, given the importance of public awareness and de-
bate in a democracy, policymakers should start with a baseline
of transparency—that as much corporate tax return informa-
tion as possible should be publicly accessible. They should
then analyze the specific documents that would be subject to a
public disclosure requirement under the proposed measure
and exempt items that would (1) encourage benchmarking
and reverse engineering, (2) expose proprietary information
of corporations to competitors, or (3) result in confusion
rather than clarity regarding corporate tax issues. Rather than
assigning weights to each individual principle or attempting to
put a number on the unquantifiable, this approach will enable
policymakers to enhance public awareness and debate of the
corporate tax law without generating the potential adverse
consequences discussed above.
B. Return Information That Should Not Be Publicly Accessible
Mandated public disclosure of certain types of corporate
tax return information would likely lead to increased aggres-
sive corporate tax planning and distorted business decisions
without enhancing public awareness and debate of corporate
tax issues. The potential for public disclosure to encourage
286. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
CIRCULAR A-4, (2003); see generally RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL LIVERMORE,
RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT
THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008).
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corporate tax aggressiveness escalates as the level of detail
about a corporation’s tax planning, interactions with the tax
authority and business operations increases. Applying the
three guiding principles presented above, this Subpart de-
scribes several examples of corporate tax return information
that should not be publicly accessible: complete tax returns;
economic substance tax penalties; and base erosion and profit
shifting reporting.
1. Complete Tax Returns
In the name of increased tax transparency, policymakers,
tax scholars and journalists frequently argue that the “tax re-
turns” of publicly traded corporations should be publicly ac-
cessible.287 Their statements, which often respond directly to
corporate representatives who argue that the public would be
confused by “truckloads” of tax return information,288 strongly
suggest that some advocates of this position believe that all cor-
porate tax returns should be public. For example, Reuven Avi-
Yonah, an advocate of the use of the corporate income tax as a
regulatory tool, has proclaimed, “I do not believe in corporate
tax privacy.”289 Other commentators have similarly asserted
that corporations have “no legitimate privacy interests.”290 Par-
ticipants in this debate thus often contemplate proposals that
would “make the entire corporate tax return public.”291
When public disclosure advocates argue that complete
corporate “tax returns” should be publicly accessible, they are
referring, knowingly or not, not just to one document, but also
287. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 18 (discussing why “corporate
tax returns should be public”); Thorndike, supra note 20 (advocating for
disclosure of “corporate tax returns”); Bruce Bartlett, Effective Corporate Tax
Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs.ny
times.com/2013/11/26/effective-corporate-tax-rates/ (advocating for pub-
licity of “corporate tax returns”); EDITORIAL BD. OF BLOOMBERG VIEW, supra
note 14 (arguing for disclosure of “corporate tax returns”); Salmon, supra
note 14 (“[W]hy not at least require all public US companies to file their
federal tax returns with the SEC[?]”); Rampell, supra note 14.
288. See Mohr, supra note 135.
289. Lee Sheppard, supra note 223 (quoting Avi-Yonah).
290. Lee Sheppard, OECD BEPS Action Plan: Trying to Save the System, 140
TAX NOTES 283 (2013).
291. Enron: The Joint Committee on Taxation’s Investigative Report, S. Hrg. 108-
117 (statement of Dr. Edmund Outslay, Member, S. Comm. on Fin.); see also
TAX EXEC. INST., supra note 22; Canellos & Kleinbard, supra note 42.
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to many documents, which, in the aggregate, can consist of
thousands of pages each year. The complete annual tax return
of a corporation, IRS Form 1120, sets forth a multinational
corporation’s gross income, deductions, taxable income and
taxes owed, but also dozens of attached forms, schedules and
explanatory documents.292 For example, if General Electric’s
2010 annual tax return were printed on paper, it would consist
of 57,000 pages.293 In addition to the annual return, publicly
traded corporations file numerous returns with the IRS
throughout the year, such as required disclosure forms regard-
ing potentially abusive transactions, forms related to changes
in capital structure and forms that describe adjustments to
prior year’s returns, among many others.294
This Subpart addresses the proposition that complete cor-
porate tax returns should be open to public inspection. Draw-
ing from statements of advocates of this position, I apply the
definition of “return” contained in the Internal Revenue
Code, which refers to “any tax or information return”295 filed
with the IRS. As I will argue, complete corporate tax returns
should not be publicly accessible.
Strategic Defenses. With unfettered access to complete cor-
porate tax returns of other corporations, significant sharehold-
ers, non-tax managers and corporate tax directors could estab-
lish, and then attempt to meet, benchmarks of aggressiveness
in several tax compliance areas. Access to complete corporate
tax returns would also arm tax advisors and corporate tax di-
rectors with otherwise unobservable information about the ac-
tions of the IRS in corporate tax enforcement, which could
cause tax directors to alter their own tax planning and report-
ing practices.
Benchmarking. For an example of the potential bench-
marking effects that could stem from public disclosure of com-
plete corporate tax returns, consider tax compliance related to
292. See I.R.S. Instructions for Form 1120 (2013), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120.pdf.
293. See John McCormack, GE Filed 57,000-Page Tax Return, Paid No Taxes
on $14 Billion in Profits, WKLY STANDARD (Nov. 17, 2011, 1:11 PM), http://
www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/ge-filed-57000-page-tax-return-paid-no-
taxes-14-billion-profits_609137.html.
294. See Tax Information for Corporations, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/
Businesses/Corporations (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
295. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1) (2012).
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transfer pricing. A major current threat to the U.S. corporate
income tax base is abusive transfer pricing,296 which commen-
tators have estimated costs the United States tens of billions of
dollars of tax revenue each year.297 Transfer pricing is a
method of allocating profits from a multinational corporation
among the various jurisdictions where the corporation and its
subsidiaries operate.298 Transfer pricing arrangements create
the potential for abuse because they involve transactions be-
tween related parties that may not feature market prices.299
The transfer pricing structures and strategies of large mul-
tinational corporations are not publicly observable, including
by the shareholders and managers of competing corporations.
SEC regulations require corporations to identify subsidiaries
by name and their jurisdiction of incorporation unless the sub-
sidiaries are not considered to be “significant,” defined as
greater than 10% of consolidated assets or pretax income.300
Large multinational corporations, however, have reduced dis-
closure of their own subsidiaries significantly over time.301 As
an example, in 2011, Google disclosed in its Form 10-K the
existence of only two Irish subsidiaries, despite its ownership
of many other subsidiaries.302
Public access to complete corporate tax returns, however,
would enable significant shareholders, non-tax managers and
corporate tax directors to observe whether competitor corpo-
rations had engaged in certain related party transactions or
296. For discussion, see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-37-
10, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATED TO POSSIBLE INCOME SHIFTING
AND TRANSFER PRICING (2010).
297. See Clausing, supra note 11; Tax Reform: Tax Havens, Base Erosion and
Profit-Shifting: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 113th Cong.
(2013) (statement of Prof. Edward D. Kleinbard).
298. I.R.C. § 482 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 (2014). For further general
description, see MARC M. LEVEY, STEVEN C. WRAPPE ET AL., TRANSFER PRICING
RULES AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK ¶ 100 (CCH, 2006).
299. For discussion, see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 296;
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution
of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89 (1995).
300. Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02 (2014).
301. See, e.g., Michael P. Donohoe et al., Through a Glass Darkly: What Can
We Learn About a U.S. Multinational Corporation’s International Operations from
Its Financial Statement Disclosures?, 65 NAT. TAX. J. 961 (2012).
302. Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 71, at 79. For
discussion, see Donohoe et al., supra note 301.
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had moved businesses offshore. For instance, with access to
complete corporate tax returns, a corporation’s stakeholders
could view other corporations’ IRS forms that describe related
party transactions, including loans, services and transfers of
goods, such as IRS Form 5471 (filed by U.S. corporations with
non-U.S. subsidiaries)303 and IRS Form 5472 (filed by U.S. cor-
porations with non-U.S. parent corporations).304 As another
example, public access to complete corporate tax returns
would enable a corporation’s stakeholders to observe the “cost
sharing agreement statement,” which describes a corporation’s
intangible development cost sharing arrangements with other
related corporations and their respective countries of organi-
zation,305 and which corporations must update annually.306
This information would reveal whether a corporation engages
in tax planning involving specific jurisdictions.307 With access
to complete tax returns, a corporation’s stakeholders could
also observe the details of the cost sharing agreements them-
selves, if a corporation files the agreement with the IRS.308
They could learn further about other corporations’ transfer
pricing arrangements by reviewing descriptions of uncertain
tax positions disclosed on Schedule UTP (Uncertain Tax Posi-
tion Statement).309
There are several potential adverse tax compliance conse-
quences to providing a corporation’s stakeholders with so
much information about the transfer pricing strategies of their
competitors. With access to complete corporate tax return in-
formation, significant shareholders may pressure management
to pursue more aggressive transfer pricing planning to lower
their global effective tax rate.310 Access to the cost sharing
agreement statement, for instance, could lead influential
shareholder groups and non-tax management to push corpo-
303. I.R.S. Form 5471 (Rev. Dec. 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/f5471.pdf.
304. I.R.S. Form 5472 (Rev. Dec. 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/f5472.pdf.
305. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(k)(4) (2014).
306. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(k)(4)(iii)(B) (2014).
307. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(k)(4)(ii)(C) (2014).
308. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(k)(2)(iii)(B) (2014).
309. I.R.S. Instructions for Schedule UTP (Form 1120) (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120utp.pdf.
310. See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text.
2014] RECONSIDERING CORPORATE TAX PRIVACY 91
rate tax directors to explore transfer pricing arrangements in-
volving low-tax jurisdictions, including tax havens, which they
had previously rejected. Other documents, such as cost shar-
ing arrangements, could enable tax directors themselves to
discover a new strategy for allocating income from intangible
assets.311
Another example of the potential benchmarking effects
of complete public access can be illustrated by considering the
effect of making “red flag” disclosure forms, which corpora-
tions file with the IRS, publicly accessible. The IRS routinely
creates special disclosure forms that corporations must file,
along with their annual tax returns, to alert the IRS that it
should investigate specific tax positions.312 For example, the
IRS requires corporations to file Form 8886 (Reportable
Transaction Statement) whenever it engages in a transaction
that the IRS has specifically designated as a “listed transac-
tion,” which it will challenge as abusive,313 and “transactions of
interest,” which are transactions that it suspects may be abu-
sive.314 Typically, once the IRS designates a transaction as a
listed transaction or transaction of interest, corporations cease
using this strategy and move on to pursue others.315 However,
even if the corporation has already participated in the transac-
tion by the time the IRS designates it as a listed transaction or
transaction of interest, it must still file Form 8886 with the IRS
retroactively316 or face significant nondisclosure tax penal-
ties317 and an open-ended statute of limitations.318 In addition,
corporations must file Form 8886 whenever they engage in a
transaction that generates a tax loss of $10 million or more,319
or when they engage in a transaction where the adviser pro-
hibits the corporation from revealing the tax advice to
311. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7 (2014) (describing cost sharing arrange-
ment requirements).
312. For discussion see Sheryl Stratton, Inside OTSA: A Bird’s-Eye View of
Shelter Central at the IRS, 100 TAX NOTES 1246, 1246–47 (2003); Blank, supra
note 155, at 1637–42; see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-7, 1.6011-4(e)(1) (2014).
313. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2014).
314. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(6) (2014).
315. For discussion, see Blank, supra note 155.
316. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(e)(2)(i) (2014).
317. I.R.C. § 6707A(b)(1) (2012).
318. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(10) (2012).
319. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5)(i)(A) (2014).
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others.320 When filing the form, the corporation must describe
the transaction disclosed, including “all information known”
to the corporation.321
While many red flag disclosure forms would not provide
detailed descriptions of tax avoidance transactions if observa-
ble, they would offer investors, non-tax management and tax
directors the ability to gauge degrees of tax aggressiveness
among corporations. Experts, including tax advisory firms,
could review these publicly disclosed red flag disclosure forms
to identify the type of tax strategy employed by the disclosing
corporation. (For an example of experts’ exhaustive review of
Form 8886, consider the in-depth coverage of then-Presiden-
tial candidate Mitt Romney’s 2012 release of his individual tax
returns, which included several Form 8886 submissions).322 By
reviewing the red flag disclosure forms of competitors, a cor-
poration’s stakeholders and agents could determine that cer-
tain competitors have been more willing to engage in aggres-
sive tax planning than their own corporation. While it is un-
likely that the result of these observations would be that a
corporation’s significant shareholders or non-tax managers
would direct their corporation’s tax director to participate in
listed transactions or transactions of interest used by competi-
tors in the past (since the IRS will likely challenge these trans-
actions now),323 a more probable result is that these stakehold-
ers would pressure a conservative tax director to pursue more
aggressive tax planning.
Further, some red flag disclosure forms could enable so-
phisticated investors to determine that their corporation’s
competitors have engaged in novel tax avoidance strategies,
which the IRS has not declared as abusive, but that nonethe-
320. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6011-4(b)(3), (4) (2014).
321. I.R.S. Instructions for Form 8886 (Rev. Mar. 2011), available at http:
//www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8886.pdf
322. When Mitt Romney released his 2010 federal income tax return in
January 2012, hundreds of journalists, political consultants and tax experts
reviewed the lengthy documents and distilled the information into a format
digestible by the general public. See, e.g., Nick Baumann & Adam Serwer, 9
Things to Know About Mitt Romney’s Tax Returns, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 21,
2012, 5:12 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/authors/nick-baumann?
page=9; Floyd Norris, Nicholas Confessore & Stephanie Strom, Inside the
Romney Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012, 8:42 AM), http://thecaucus.
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/inside-the-romney-tax-returns/.
323. For discussion, see Blank, supra note 155.
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less must be disclosed. For example, public disclosure of Form
8886 could enable sophisticated analysts to uncover the details
of a homegrown strategy of a single in-house corporate tax de-
partment, which generated a tax loss of at least $10 million,324
but which is not a “listed transaction” or “transaction of inter-
est.” In addition, corporations meeting asset thresholds are
also required to file Schedule UTP (Uncertain Tax Positions)
along with their annual tax returns,325 which requires them to
identify tax positions for which they have established a reserve
for financial accounting purposes, positions where the corpo-
ration believes it cannot meet the more-likely-than-not stan-
dard described earlier, or the corporation has not established
a reserve because it expects to litigate the issue if chal-
lenged.326 When filing this form, corporations must describe
its uncertain tax positions (for financial accounting purposes)
and also include a concise description of the position, which
would enable the IRS to ask follow-up questions during an au-
dit.327 If sophisticated investors and non-tax management
could review these forms to learn of new tax avoidance strate-
gies, they could pressure their own tax director to consider
pursuing these strategies as well.328
In addition, if a corporate tax director could observe the
red flag disclosure forms of other corporations, especially
those of corporations with aggressive tax directors, he could
determine that his corporation has disclosed too much informa-
tion to the IRS compared to his competitors. Because the IRS
has designed these disclosure forms to provide it with as much
information as possible about potentially abusive tax positions
324. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5)(i)(A) (2014).
325. I.R.S. Schedule UTP (Form 1120) (2013), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/f1120utp- -2013.pdf.
326. See id.
327. I.R.S Instructions for Schedule UTP (Form 1120) (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120utp.pdf.
328. With public disclosure, analysts could compare a corporation’s pub-
licly disclosed tax reserves for uncertain tax positions (also noted on Sched-
ule UTP) and match these positions to reportable transaction forms that
may provide additional detail. A study by Petro Lisowsky, Leslie Robinson,
and Andrew Schmidt in 2013 found a correlation between a corporation’s
publicly disclosed tax reserves for uncertain tax positions and their submis-
sion of reportable transaction forms. Petro Lisowsky, Leslie Robinson & An-
drew Schmidt, Do Publicly Disclosed Tax Reserves Tell Us About Privately Disclosed
Tax Shelter Activity?, 51 J. OF ACCT. RES. 583 (2013).
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of corporations, as opposed to all of a corporation’s tax posi-
tions, the forms are over-inclusive by design.329 As a result, cor-
porate tax directors have expressed concern regarding the
level of detail they are required to provide to the IRS on these
forms, especially as a result of the significant increased tax
penalties that can result if the IRS determines that a corpora-
tion’s disclosure form is not adequate.330 For example, corpo-
rate tax directors and their advisors have argued that many as-
pects of Schedule UTP are ambiguous, including the meaning
of a “concise” description of the disclosed transaction.331 With
access to complete tax returns, a tax director could observe
that several of his counterparts at other corporations have in-
cluded vague descriptions of their uncertain tax positions or
included extraneous references to the Internal Revenue Code
on the required line on Schedule UTP. The tax director could
respond by adjusting his own corporation’s submission of
Schedule UTP to reduce the amount of detail it provides to
the IRS. The result of this response would be to weaken the
ability of the IRS to use red flag disclosure forms, such as Form
8886 or Schedule UTP, to detect and challenge abusive tax
strategies.
Reverse Engineering. A further consequence of offering the
public access to such a broad category of information as com-
plete corporate tax returns is that this action would also allow
profit-motivated tax advisors and corporate tax directors to ob-
serve documents that would reveal important aspects of the
IRS’s corporate tax enforcement strategies.
First, complete corporate tax returns include forms that
would enable sophisticated analysts to observe controversies
where the IRS asserted deficiencies and entered into settle-
ments with other corporations. For example, at the end of an
audit, if the taxpayer owes additional tax liability or tax penal-
ties, the IRS prepares IRS Form 5701 (Notice of Proposed Ad-
329. For discussion, see Blank, supra note 155.
330. See id.
331. See, e.g., William Garofalo, Schedule UTP Issue Descriptions—How Much
Disclosure Is Best?, 91 PRAC. TAX STRAT. 223 (2013); Glen Cheney, Internal
Revenue Service Meets FIN 48, FIN. EXEC., Apr. 2010, at 14–15, available at
http://www.financialexecutives.org/KenticoCMS/Financial-ExecutiveMaga
zine/2010_04/Financial-Reporting- -April-2010.aspx#axzz3IbenI0Q8; Ilya A.
Lipin, Uncertain Tax Positions and the New Tax Policy of Disclosure Through the
Schedule UTP, 30 VA. TAX REV. 663 (2011).
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justment)332 and IRS Form 870 (Waiver of Restrictions on As-
sessment).333 A corporation that has settled a dispute with the
IRS countersigns and files these forms with the IRS. On the
face of IRS Form 5701, the IRS must provide a written narra-
tive that describes the reasons for the proposed adjustment.334
Public access to complete corporate tax returns, including
these forms, would thus reveal IRS challenges and settlements
that occur in controversies related to transfer pricing and re-
portable transactions, among many others.
Second, another source of valuable information regard-
ing the IRS’s enforcement practices are amended tax returns.
In addition to the forms that summarize the reasons for adjust-
ments following IRS audit, corporations frequently file
amended tax returns in order to revise previously claimed po-
sitions.335 By examining amended corporate tax returns,
where corporations have revised previously claimed positions,
analysts could reveal adjustments that may have resulted from
IRS challenges, especially if they determine that these changes
occur consistently among a large group of corporate taxpay-
ers.
Third, public access to complete corporate tax returns
could reveal that the IRS did not challenge certain tax posi-
tions of specific corporations as a result of the statute of limita-
tions on assessment. With access to several years’ worth of tax
returns, a sophisticated analyst could determine that a corpo-
ration had claimed a questionable tax position (such as by ob-
serving the reporting of a listed transaction or transaction of
interest).336 As a result of the expiration of the statute of limi-
tations regarding the position and an absence of any forms
that reveal deficiency disputes related to it, that the IRS did
not challenge the position. For example, if a corporation fails
to disclose a listed transaction, such as the intermediary corpo-
332. I.R.S. Form 5701 (Rev. Dec. 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-utl/f5701.pdf.
333. I.R.S. Form 870 (Rev. Mar. 1992), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-utl/form870.pdf.
334. I.R.S. Form 5701 (Rev. Dec. 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-utl/f5701.pdf; see also I.R.S. Form 4549-E (May 1993), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/form4549e.pdf.
335. See I.R.S. Form 1120X (Rev. Jan. 2011), available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120x.pdf.
336. See supra notes 313–14.
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ration tax shelter, the statute of limitations remains open.337
But as long as the corporation files the disclosure statement
regarding the abusive tax strategy, the statute of limitations
may expire within as little time as three years from the filing of
the corporation’s tax return.338 Once the statute of limitations
clock stops, absent fraud or another special exception, the IRS
will not be able to challenge tax benefits the corporation has
claimed using the abusive tax shelter.339 With access to com-
plete tax returns, corporate tax directors and advisors would
gain the ability to observe tax positions that the IRS has de-
cided not to challenge.
Finally, with access to complete corporate tax returns,
spanning several years, third-party advisors could develop
quantitative, rather than qualitative, methods of analysis that
would enable corporate tax directors and tax advisors to gain
far greater knowledge of the IRS’s tax enforcement techniques
than they possess currently.340 Corporate tax directors, for ex-
ample, could determine whether inter-company arrangements
involving specific countries (such as certain tax haven jurisdic-
tion) and business activities (such as location of customer
lists), among many other factors, are statistically more likely
than others to result in IRS scrutiny and challenge. Likewise,
empirical analysis of corporate tax return data would enable
corporate tax directors to determine the minimum level of dis-
closure, in terms of specificity and quantity of description, that
the IRS accepts without subjecting corporate taxpayers to oth-
erwise enforceable tax penalties for failing to make required
disclosures to the IRS.341
Proprietary Information. Public disclosure of complete cor-
porate tax returns would result in significant exposure of pro-
prietary information. The following is a sampling of proprie-
tary information contained in complete corporate tax returns:
public access would require a large corporation to reveal its
trading strategy by requiring it to publish IRS Form 1120,
337. I.R.C. § 6501(c)(10) (2012).
338. Id. § 6501(a).
339. Id.
340. For discussion, see supra notes 207–20 and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6707A(b)(2)(A) (2012) ($200,000 penalty for failure
to disclose listed transactions); I.R.C. § 6707A(b)(2)(B) (2012) ($50,000
penalty for failure to disclose other reportable transactions).
2014] RECONSIDERING CORPORATE TAX PRIVACY 97
Schedule D,342 which describes the capital gains and losses of a
corporation.343 In addition, certain accompanying documenta-
tion could reveal insights about a corporation’s future business
plans, such as supporting documents that describe the compo-
nents of a corporation’s deduction for advertising expenses.
Publication of IRS Form 1125-E would require corporations to
disclose the compensation it pays to its 25 highest compen-
sated officers by name, information which is far in excess of
the number of officers required to be disclosed in SEC fil-
ings.344 Several schedules and forms would provide detailed in-
formation regarding the structure and ownership of a large
corporation.345 Public access, in its most comprehensive form,
consequently, would expose a wealth of information that a cor-
poration’s competitors could use to their advantage.
A frequent response from public access proponents is that
these concerns could easily be resolved by allowing corpora-
tions to redact proprietary information.346 Yet even if corpora-
tions bear “the burden . . . to argue that particular information
should be kept private by redactions,” a likely response is that
many of the schedules and forms should be redacted in their
entirety. For example, a corporation may argue that an IRS
Form 8832 (Entity Classification Election),347 which would re-
veal whether a corporation “checked the box” to treat an en-
tity as a corporation or as a disregarded entity, would reveal
sensitive information to competitors about the corporation’s
organizational structure and future business plans. Under cur-
rent law, the IRS releases private letter rulings in redacted
342. I.R.S. Schedule D (Form 1120) (2013), available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sd.pdf.
343. Id.
344. I.R.S. Form 1125-E (Rev. Dec. 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/f1125e.pdf.
345. See, e.g., I.R.S. Schedule N (Form 1120) (2013), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-access/f1120sn_accessible.pdf (revealing non-U.S. juris-
dictions in which a U.S. corporation owns subsidiaries); I.R.S. Schedule G
(Form 1120) (Rev. Dec. 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ac
cess/f1120sg_accessible.pdf (identifying certain significant owners of the
corporation’s voting stock); I.R.S. Form 5472 (Rev. Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-access/f5472_accessible.pdf (identifying 25%
non-U.S. owners).
346. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Siman, supra note 18; Pomp, supra note 19.
347. I.R.S. Form 8832 (Rev. Dec. 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/f8832.pdf.
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form.348 Taxpayers regularly request significant redactions of
material from these background file documents.349 A similar
response from corporations is likely in the case of public ac-
cess to complete tax returns.
In light of the significant amount of proprietary informa-
tion contained in the pages of a complete corporate tax re-
turn, some large corporations could reduce their cooperation
with the IRS if all documents filed with the annual tax return
were public record.350 Empirical studies involving corporate
tax return information provide additional support for this hy-
pothesis. For example, in a 2013 study, Erin Towery examined
confidential corporate tax return and financial accounting
documents to determine the effect of the IRS’s requirement
that corporations file Schedule UTP with the IRS on the cor-
poration’s financial accounting reserves.351 Towery found that
some firms adjusted their financial accounting reporting in or-
der to avoid describing issues as uncertain tax positions, which
would otherwise be required to be reported on Schedule
UTP.352 As this example illustrates, corporate managers are ca-
pable of manipulating information they are required to report
on tax return documents.353
348. See I.R.S. IRM 7.28.4.4 (June 30, 2009) (Guidelines for Deletion (Re-
daction)).
349. Before the ruling is finalized, the IRS allows taxpayers to redact any
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a per-
son and privileged or confidential” from the private letter ruling itself and
from the background file documents using brackets to highlight the pro-
posed deletions. Rev. Proc. 2013-1, 2013-1 C.B. 21, § 7.01(11) (deletion state-
ment required by § 6110).
350. This permits, but does not require corporations to submit attach-
ments with Form 1120. See I.R.S. Instructions for Form 1120, at 3 (2013),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120.pdf.
351. Erin M. Towery, How Do Disclosures of Tax Uncertainty to Tax Authorities
Affect Reporting Decisions?: Evidence from Schedule UTP (2013) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas), available at http://repositories.lib.u
texas.edu/handle/2152/21819.
352. Id.
353. See id.; see also Hasegawa et al., supra note 48 (reporting results from a
study involving Japanese corporate tax returns showing that where there was
a threshold for disclosure tied to taxable income, a non-trivial number of
corporate taxpayers whose tax liability would otherwise have been close to
the threshold engaged in underreporting of income to avoid public disclo-
sure).
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Public Awareness and Debate. Public access to complete cor-
porate tax returns would certainly reveal specific examples of
how the corporate tax law operates in practice in the United
States and could stimulate public debate. By viewing complete
corporate tax returns, the public could learn the amount of a
multinational corporation’s gross income and deductions, its
U.S. tax liability, its uncertain tax positions, and background
information regarding the reason for specific line items on the
corporation’s tax return (to the extent this information is not
redacted).
At the same time, public disclosure of complete corporate
tax returns could cause the media to focus on information re-
vealed in these returns and supporting documents that is unre-
lated to the corporation’s use of specific tax provisions or tax
avoidance strategies. For example, if a high-profile corpora-
tion’s tax return reveals that it has been investing in research
and development of a new product line or is increasing its
marketing and promotion expenses related to a particular
product,354 the media could highlight these items more prom-
inently than the corporation’s substantive tax positions. Media
attention on these issues is tangential to, and possibly in con-
flict with, what should be the primary objective of public dis-
closure of corporate tax return information: to stimulate pub-
lic debate about the design and operation of the corporate tax
law. In addition, the media could focus excessively on a corpo-
ration’s filing of a required reportable transaction form, which
as has been discussed, is over-inclusive and may not necessarily
signal abuse.355 For example, corporations must file a reporta-
ble transaction statement whenever they engage in transac-
tions that result in a tax loss of $10 million or more,356 even
though in many cases, the transaction may not be abusive.357
Given the incentive of the media to report stories that will at-
tract interest, it is not clear that providing public access to
complete tax return information would necessarily result in
more coherent public debate and discussion of corporate tax
issues. As I will discuss, there are alternative disclosure pos-
354. See, e.g., I.R.S. Form 1120, l. 22 (Advertising) (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120.pdf.
355. For discussion, see Blank, supra note 155.
356. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5)(i)(A) (2014).
357. Id.; see also Rev. Proc. 2004-66, I.R.B. 2004-50 (describing reportable
loss transactions).
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sibilities that could more effectively enhance public awareness
and debate of corporate tax issues.
2. Economic Substance Tax Penalty
A more targeted public access possibility, which policy-
makers and academics have suggested,358 would require cor-
porations to publicly disclose instances in which they have paid
an “economic substance” tax penalty to the IRS359 and to de-
scribe the reason for the tax penalty.360 To deter taxpayers
from pursing abusive tax shelters, in 2010, Congress enacted a
special tax penalty that applies when a taxpayer loses a tax ben-
efit as a result of the application of the economic substance
doctrine or “any similar rule of law.”361 Under the statute, a
taxpayer’s transaction possesses economic substance only if it
changes the taxpayer’s economic position in a meaningful
way, apart from tax effects, and if the taxpayer has a substantial
purpose, apart from tax reasons, for entering into the transac-
tion.362 The economic substance tax penalty is significant com-
pared to other tax penalties; it is equal to 20% of the un-
derpayment of tax, increasing to 40% in the case of non-dis-
closed transactions,363 and cannot be waived as a result of a
reasonable cause defense.364 The IRS can assert this tax pen-
358. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Charles Grassley, Grassley Highlights
Corporate Loophole Closers in New Tax Bill (Oct. 14, 2004), available at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=0226539a
-1c0d-4b69-96e3-5094c8923f32.
359. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2012).
360. Current law does not require public disclosure when a corporation
pays a tax penalty for engaging in reportable transactions or transactions
lacking economic substance. However, under current law, corporations are
required to disclose in SEC filings instances in which they have paid tax pen-
alties to the IRS for failure to disclose to the IRS certain reportable transac-
tions. I.R.C. § 6707A(e)(2) (2012). When making this disclosure in SEC fil-
ings, the IRS requires corporations to describe the reason for the payment of
the tax penalty, including applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code. See Rev. Proc. 2005-51, 2005-2 C.B. 296.
361. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 1029, 1067-68 (codified at I.R.C. § 7701(o)
(2012)).
362. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (2012).
363. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6) (2012).
364. I.R.C. § 6664(c) (2012).
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alty following an audit;365 it does not need to pursue litigation
in order to conclude that a transaction lacks economic sub-
stance. Similar publicity measures have been proposed by both
government officials and scholars,366 and to a limited extent,
appear in other related contexts under current law.367 For ex-
ample, the original draft of the legislation containing the eco-
nomic substance tax penalty, which the Senate passed in 2004,
would have obligated corporations to disclose in SEC public
filings their payment of any penalties for engaging in non-eco-
nomic substance transactions368 and would have also required
the IRS “to make public the name” of any corporation that
paid the tax penalty.369 Despite the potential appeal of this
publicity measure as a reputational sanction, policymakers
should not require corporations to publicly disclose payment
of the economic substance tax penalty.
Strategic Defenses. One of the primary strengths of the eco-
nomic substance tax penalty is that its application is uncertain;
corporate tax directors do not know in advance whether the
IRS or the courts will apply the tax penalty to a particular tax
strategy. Congress appears to have contemplated the value of
this uncertainty when designing the tax penalty.370 By allowing
corporate tax directors and their advisors to observe all in-
365. See I.R.S., Guidance for Examiners and Managers on the Codified Ec-
onomic Substance Doctrine and Related Penalties (2011), available at http:
//www.irs.gov/Businesses/Guidance-for-Examiners-and-Managers-on-the-
Codified-Economic-Substance-Doctrine-and-Related-Penalties.
366. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Charles Grassley, supra note 358; Jay
A. Soled & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., A Little Shame Might Just Deter Tax Cheaters,
USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2008, at 12A; Kornhauser, supra note 20, at 104; Linda
M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and Corporate Tax Shelters: Respond-
ing to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame and Strict Liability, 29 J. CORP. L. 219, 222
(2004).
367. See I.R.C. § 6707A(e)(2) (2012) (SEC disclosure requirement for cor-
porations that pay tax penalty for failure to disclose reportable transaction to
IRS).
368. Jumpstart Our Business Strength (JOBS) Act, S. 1637, 108th Cong.
§ 402, 150 Cong. Rec. S. 5622, 5643 (May 18, 2004) (requiring SEC disclo-
sure when taxpayer “is required to pay a penalty . . . with respect to any
noneconomic substance transaction.”).
369. Id.
370. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-18-10, TECHNICAL EX-
PLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF
2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT” 155 (2010).
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stances in which other corporations paid this particular tax
penalty to the IRS, this public disclosure measure would have
the unintended effect of reducing the uncertainty associated
with the economic substance tax penalty.
Reverse Engineering. The primary danger of this publicity
measure is that it would reduce the legal and enforcement un-
certainty associated with the economic substance penalty. This
uncertainty can deter some taxpayers from engaging in risky
tax planning and reporting behavior.371 In response to the ec-
onomic substance tax penalty, corporate tax directors and
their advisors have widely expressed “uncertainty,”372 “con-
cern”373 and “anxiety”374 that they cannot predict whether the
economic substance tax penalty should apply to certain trans-
actions as a legal matter and whether the IRS will seek to apply
it in specific situations.
If corporations were required to disclose instances in
which the IRS has asserted the economic substance tax penalty
against them and summarize the underlying transaction, how-
ever, corporate tax directors and their advisors could observe
the specific transactions of other corporations that led the IRS
to apply the tax penalty. Put differently, this publicity measure
would reveal the IRS’s precise application of the economic
substance tax penalty. Responding to the uncertain nature of
this new tax penalty, in 2011, the IRS issued a directive to its
field agents and examiners that described the factors that the
IRS would consider in determining whether to seek applica-
tion of the tax penalty.375 These include factors such as
whether the transaction at issue “is highly structured,” “in-
371. See, e.g., Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Boundary Effects of Vague Risk
Information on Taxpayer Decisions, 50 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DEC. PROCESSES 360
(1991); Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Moderate
Fault-Based Penalties, 64 TAX L. REV. 453 (2010); Tom Baker, Alon Harel &
Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89
IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004). For further discussion, see Sarah B. Lawsky, Model-
ing Uncertainty in Tax Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 241, 244 (2013).
372. Jeremiah Coder, Economic Substance Guidance Should Reassure, Official
Says, 133 TAX NOTES 1318 (2011) (discussing IRS attempts to quell “linger-
ing uncertainty” regarding the codified economic substance doctrine).
373. Jodi J. Schwartz, Economic Substance Doctrine and Subchapter C: What, Me
Worry?, TAXES, Mar. 2011, at 113.
374. Jeffrey T. Sheffield, Corporate Transactions and the Economic Substance
Doctrine, 89 TAXES–TAX MAG. 113, 163 (2011).
375. I.R.S., supra note 365.
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cludes unnecessary steps,” and “is outside the taxpayer’s ordi-
nary business operations.”376 By reviewing actual transactions
where the IRS sought the tax penalty, including by applying
quantitative methods of analysis, corporate tax directors and
their advisors could gain significantly more concrete insights
into the IRS’s approach.377 An unintended effect of this mea-
sure, consequently, is that it could weaken the potential deter-
rent effect of the economic substance tax penalty.
Proprietary Information. This publicity measure would be
unlikely to reveal sensitive non-tax proprietary information of
a corporation unless corporations were required to provide
lengthy, detailed descriptions of the underlying transactions.
Nevertheless, some corporate tax directors in the U.S. appear
to fear adverse tax shelter publicity (a fear I have argued is
unfounded).378 Under current law, when faced with a defi-
ciency finding from the IRS, a tax director can settle the dis-
pute with the IRS behind the curtain of tax privacy, or the tax
director can choose to pursue litigation in public.379 The IRS
has explicitly emphasized this distinction in order to en-
courage “publicity-averse” corporate tax directors to choose to
settle potential tax shelter disputes rather than litigate.380 By
removing the option of tax privacy from disputes that may in-
volve application of the economic substance doctrine—either
way, payment of the tax penalty would become publicly observ-
able—this publicity measure could encourage some corporate
tax directors to opt to litigate rather than settle disputes. Liti-
gation would certainly require a corporation to reveal its in-
volvement in a potentially abusive tax strategy. Yet, in contrast
to the public disclosure of payment of an economic substance
tax penalty to the IRS, litigation would allow the corporation
to tell its side of the story in the sunlight of a public trial.
376. Id.
377. See, e.g., YORAM KEINAN & JASPER L. CUMMINGS, THE AM. BAR ASS’N,
BANKING & SAV. INST. COMM., THE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE: WHERE
ARE WE NOW AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT? (2011), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/taxation/taxiq-fall11-
cummings-esdslides.authcheckdam.pdf (criticizing 2011 IRS guidance on
codified economic substance doctrine).
378. See supra notes 108–19 Blank, supra note 107.
379. See I.R.C. §§ 6213, 7422 (2012).
380. I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-129 (Oct. 27, 2005), available at http://
www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Launches-Abusive-Transaction-Settlement-Initiative.
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Moreover, the possibility of a judicial victory could encourage
some tax directors to pursue litigation in economic substance
disputes rather than accept IRS branding as a tax shelter par-
ticipant.381
Public Awareness and Debate. An obvious rationale for re-
quiring public disclosure of the economic substance tax pen-
alty is to publicly shame corporations that engage in abusive
tax planning.382 The distinguishing characteristic of state-
sponsored shaming sanctions is that the government con-
demns an actor for violating a shared moral norm and issues
the condemnation in a dramatic and public fashion.383 By re-
quiring corporations that pay the economic substance tax pen-
alty to reveal this fact publicly, proponents of this measure
would likely argue that it would achieve deterrence objectives
that the exclusive application of the monetary tax penalty can-
not. Senator Charles Grassley, then-Senate Finance Committee
Chairman and a chief advocate of the publicity feature, de-
clared in 2004 that this publicity measure would deter corpo-
rate tax abuse by causing a corporation’s current and future
shareholders to reconsider “whether they want to invest in a
company with clouded business ethics.”384 Several public ac-
cess proponents have offered similar shaming proposals.385
As Part I discussed earlier, there are significant reasons to
doubt the efficacy of public shaming measures such as the re-
quirement that corporations publicly disclose their payment of
the economic substance tax penalty.386 Aside from a lack of
empirical support showing that a corporation’s shareholders,
business partners, and consumers would ostracize the corpora-
tion upon learning of its participation in an abusive tax strat-
egy,387 it is even possible that this sanction could send an unin-
tended positive signal to the members of a corporation’s com-
munity. Again, short-term investors, such as private equity and
hedge funds, are often attracted to, rather than repelled by,
381. For discussion, see Blank, supra note 233, at 591.
382. See, e.g., Soled & Ventry, supra note 104.
383. See ROLAND MULLER, HONOR AND SHAME: UNLOCKING THE DOOR 53
(2000).
384. Press Release, Senator Charles Grassley, supra note 358.
385. Kornhauser, supra note 20, at 104; see, e.g., Soled & Ventry, supra note
104; Beale, supra note 366.
386. See supra Part I.C.1.b.
387. See id.
2014] RECONSIDERING CORPORATE TAX PRIVACY 105
corporations with tax directors who claim tax positions that
“push the envelope.”388 For example, a study of market reac-
tions to corporations’ public disclosures of uncertain tax posi-
tions in SEC filings has shown that investors positively value
uncertain tax avoidance, suggesting they view tax-related con-
tingent liabilities “very differently from other liabilities.”389
These studies should cause policymakers to pause before ac-
cepting shaming as a rationale for embracing a corporate tax
publicity proposal.390
3. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Reporting
At the heart of the ongoing global discussion of how to
combat aggressive transfer pricing practices, where multina-
tional corporations pay little or no taxes on their global profits
to either their home government or any government, is a vig-
orous debate over whether organizational structure informa-
tion of large multinational corporations should be accessible
by the public. Supported by the leaders of the Group of
Twenty nations, the OECD has pursued a multi-step action
plan for combating base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS).391
To provide taxing authorities with uniform information that
could enable them to challenge abusive transfer pricing, the
BEPS initiative would require each corporation to deliver a
“master file” to every participating country.392 The BEPS
master file, as currently proposed, would consist of several
items, including an organizational structure chart showing all
legal entities that comprise the corporate group; a “country-by-
country” report, which would list taxes paid by each entity in
the corporate group to its country of organization and to all
other countries; a list of material intangibles of the corporate
388. See Nanette Byrnes & Louis Lavelle, The Corporate Tax Game, BUS. WK.,
Mar. 31, 2003, at 78.
389. Allison Koester, Investor Valuation of Tax Avoidance Through Uncertain
Tax Positions (July. 25, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Washington) (on file with author).
390. For discussion of possible reasons for lack of ostracism from consum-
ers and shareholders, see Blank, supra note 107.
391. OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013),
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf.
392. OECD, TRANSFER PRICING DOCUMENTATION AND COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY
REPORTING 27 (2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing
/discussion-draft-transfer-pricing-documentation.pdf.
106 NYU JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:31
group and which entities own them; and the number of em-
ployees of each entity in the corporate group.393
The OECD has explicitly stated that the BEPS master file
should be protected by tax privacy, commenting that tax ad-
ministrations should “ensure there is no public disclosure of
confidential information (trade secrets, scientific secrets, etc.)
and other commercially sensitive information contained in the
documentation package.”394 Such assurances respond to wide-
spread calls from industry to the OECD to develop a “stringent
confidentiality regime,”395 along with “real sanctions for coun-
tries that violate confidentiality provisions.”396 In contrast, rep-
resentatives of organizations representing labor unions have
argued that the master file should be publicly accessible be-
cause, otherwise, exchange of information requests would slow
access by some taxing authorities.397 In addition, commenta-
tors have argued that the master file should be public in the
interest of legitimacy and transparency.398
Applying the guiding public access principles outlined
above, this Subpart proposes that access to the BEPS master
file of multinational corporations should be restricted to par-
ticipating taxing authorities rather than provided to the gen-
eral public.
Strategic Defenses. To achieve its primary objective, the
BEPS master file would provide taxing authorities with a
roadmap to the transfer pricing strategies of multinational cor-
porations. At the same time, public access would likely also en-
courage benchmarking by enabling significant shareholders,
non-tax managers and corporate tax directors to observe more
aggressive, possibly novel transfer pricing strategies of their
competitors, which could rival structures like the now-famous
393. Id. at 35.
394. Id. at 24.
395. BEPS Action Plan: Action 13—Transfer Pricing Documentation, PRICE-
WATERHOUSE COOPERS, http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax/tax-policy-adminis
tration/beps/transfer-pricing-documentation.jhtml (last visited Nov. 5,
2014).
396. Id.
397. See Stephanie Soong Johnston, Stakeholders Lock Horns Over OECD’s
CbC Reporting Proposal, 143 TAX NOTES 906 (2014) (quoting Maria Villanueva
Serrano).
398. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FL. TAX REV. 55, 106
(2014); Sheppard, supra note 290.
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Double Irish Dutch Sandwich.399 Likewise, the country-by-
country report could cause a corporation’s stakeholders to
learn that competitors of their corporation have paid lower tax
bills to certain jurisdictions. A response from corporate tax di-
rectors could be to attempt to lobby these jurisdictions for in-
creased tax incentives.400 And if the master file is available to
everyone, tax advisory firms, as well as tax haven jurisdictions,
could exploit the information to pitch new tax avoidance strat-
egies to corporations whose tax departments appear to be lag-
ging compared to those of their competitors in terms of global
tax liabilities.
The short-term potential for reverse engineering the IRS’s
approach to transfer pricing based solely on the BEPS master
file is limited because the file would not directly reveal actions
of the IRS or other taxing authorities. However, if corpora-
tions release the file publicly each year, analysts could utilize
quantitative methods to determine whether corporate tax di-
rectors have abandoned, maintained or increased certain
transfer pricing strategies in response to IRS challenge or lack
thereof.
Proprietary Information. The core deliverables in the BEPS
master file, as currently proposed, represent the essence of
proprietary information. The BEPS master file would contain
the complete organizational structure chart of a large multina-
tional corporation.401 Corporations typically do not voluntarily
reveal charts that reveal their complete structure, including all
legal entities, to competitors or in public filings unless they are
required to do so.402 While proponents of requiring public ac-
cess to the BEPS master file have argued that this action would
not reveal commercially sensitive information “especially if
every multinational is doing it,”403 this claim ignores the reality
that multinational corporations utilize different and compet-
ing corporate structures as part of their overall business strat-
egy. A corporation’s use of entities in certain jurisdictions may
399. See supra note 3.
400. See OECD, supra note 392.
401. See id. at 27–29.
402. See Donohoe, supra note 301; Jessica Holzer, From Google to FedEx: The
Incredible Vanishing Subsidiary, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2013, 7:38 PM), http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873234637045784972900990
32374.
403. Johnston, supra note 397 (quoting Maria Villanueva Serrano).
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result from significant motivations other than tax avoidance,
such as jurisdictions’ corporate laws, labor standards, and nat-
ural resources, among many other factors.404 Similarly, the
OECD’s proposed country-by-country report would also re-
quire each corporation to reveal the number of employees of
each entity in its group, organized by geographic region.405
Public exposure of this information would enable competitors
to observe potentially valuable information about a multina-
tional corporation’s plans to sell or manufacture products or
otherwise expand business operations in a market.406 The
BEPS master file instructions even require corporations to re-
veal this information explicitly, such as by describing their
“overall strategy for the development, ownership and exploita-
tion of intangibles, including location of principal research
and development facilities and location of research and devel-
opment management.”407
A potential consequence of public disclosure of the BEPS
master file, including proprietary information that could be
exploited by a corporation’s U.S. and non-U.S. competitors, is
that multinational corporations may limit their participation
in the BEPS initiative. For instance, corporate tax directors
may deliver structure charts that do not contain significant de-
tail regarding every subsidiary corporation, a tactic they have
used in the past, such as in response to SEC filing require-
ments408 and requests for information by congressional com-
mittees.409 The initiative, as currently conceived, lacks credible
404. For discussion, see Victor Fleischer, Despite Tax Rules, Companies Stick
with U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2013, 2:54 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com
/2013/06/06/despite-tax-rules-companies-stick-with-u-s/; Eric J. Allen & Su-
san C. Morse, Tax Haven Incorporation for U.S. Firms: No Exodus Yet, 66 NAT’L
TAX J. 395 (2013).
405. See OECD, supra note 392, at 35.
406. See id.
407. OECD, supra note 392, at 28 (emphasis added).
408. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
409. For example, in 2013, in response to requests from the U.S. Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations inquiry, Apple provided several
structure charts that depicted the corporate structure in summary form with-
out delineating all of the legal entities that comprise Apple’s corporate struc-
ture. U.S. Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Exhibits to the
Hearing on Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code Part 2 (Apple
Inc.), at Ex. 1d (2013), available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/
?id=B2F27D33-856B-4B2A-8B55-D045DC285978.
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enforcement mechanisms.410 Without disclosure by complex
multinational corporations, the primary objectives of the BEPS
initiative are unlikely to be fulfilled.
Public Awareness and Debate. A requirement that all mul-
tinational corporations publicly file their BEPS master file
could enhance public awareness and debate of global corpo-
rate tax avoidance, as public access proponents have ar-
gued.411 With access to this information, the media and aca-
demic researchers could scrutinize which specific jurisdictions
have enabled highly recognizable corporations to pursue abu-
sive transfer pricing strategies. However, as the preceding dis-
cussion has illustrated, this increased awareness would also re-
sult in significant drawbacks, which could ultimately increase
profit shifting by certain corporations.
Rather than require multinational corporations to pub-
lish the BEPS master file, policymakers should pursue alterna-
tive measures that would stimulate meaningful debate over the
taxation of global corporate income without diminishing the
strategic defenses of corporate tax privacy and exposing pro-
prietary information. One possibility is that multinational cor-
porations could be required to publicize the taxes paid on a
cash basis by the corporate group to the United States and the
taxes paid by the corporate group to all other countries in the
aggregate. The guiding objective should be to avoid publicity
measures that would provide enough detail, such as the infor-
mation contained in the BEPS master file, to result in
benchmarking or the exposure of significant proprietary infor-
mation.
C. Return Information That Should Be Publicly Accessible
Despite the probable responses to mandated public dis-
closure of certain return information, which would likely en-
courage increased corporate tax aggressiveness, these effects
would not necessarily result from all public disclosure mea-
sures. Some public disclosure measures could stimulate valua-
ble public awareness and debate without exposing information
that would increase corporate tax aggressiveness or reveal sen-
sitive proprietary information of corporations to their compet-
410. See Lee A. Sheppard, U.S. Opposes BEPS Blunt Instruments, 143 TAX
NOTES 157 (2014) (quoting Robert Stack).
411. See, e.g., Brauner, supra note 398.
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itors. This Subpart provides three examples of return informa-
tion that should be subject to public disclosure: Form 1120
only, Schedule M-3, and corporate “pink slips.”
1. Form 1120 Only
While there are several strong reasons to reject proposals
to require public disclosure of complete corporate tax returns,
policymakers should require publication of a publicly traded
corporation’s IRS Form 1120, the annual U.S. corporate in-
come tax return, without any accompanying schedules, forms,
or attachments. Compared to the 57,000-page complete an-
nual tax return for 2010 of General Electric, the Form 1120,
absent any attached schedules, is substantially shorter: it is one
single-sided page.412
Strategic Defenses. The chance that publication of Form
1120 only would have benchmarking effects is far lower than
in a regime where complete corporate tax returns, including
forms, schedules and supporting documentation, were pub-
licly accessible. Access to the single-page Form 1120 of all pub-
licly traded corporations would enable a corporation’s signifi-
cant shareholders and non-tax management to observe
whether other corporations made lower tax payments and
paid lower effective U.S. tax rates on income subject to U.S.
tax than their own corporation. However, lower taxes and
lower effective tax rates of competitor corporations often do
not reveal that these competitors are more  aggressive in their
tax planning, defined by engaging in transactions that yield
tax benefits Congress did not intend.413 For instance, a corpo-
ration with an effective U.S. tax rate, measured by dividing
U.S. tax liability by U.S. taxable income, of 12% is not necessa-
rily more aggressive in its tax planning than a corporation with
an effective U.S. tax rate of 15%. Low effective tax rates are
often due to a corporation’s use of foreign tax credits on in-
come earned outside of the U.S.414 or the corporation’s use of
special tax credits, such as the nonconventional fuel credit.415
Similarly, low tax payments by corporations are often the re-
412. I.R.S. Form 1120 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf
/f1120.pdf.
413. See supra note 147.
414. I.R.C. § 901(a) (2012).
415. I.R.C. § 45K (2012).
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sult of the corporation’s use of net operating loss carryfor-
wards,416 accelerated depreciation417 and other tax benefits
that are explicitly intended by Congress. Without access to the
many documents underlying the single-page Form 1120, a cor-
poration’s significant shareholders and non-tax management
would have little ability to determine whether competitor cor-
porations reduced their tax burden using specific aggressive
tax strategies. Form 1120 reveals a corporation’s ultimate an-
nual taxable income and tax liability, among other items, but
does not reveal the specific tax planning techniques, such as
transfer pricing structures involving tax haven jurisdictions,
that the corporation used to achieve these results.418 Moreo-
ver, as Form 1120 would not reveal the results of IRS audits,
imposition of tax penalties, or IRS guidance issued directly to
the taxpayer, corporate tax directors and their advisors would
have little ability to use this form to reverse engineer the IRS’s
approach to corporate tax enforcement.
Proprietary Information. A requirement that corporations
publish Form 1120 only would reveal little proprietary infor-
mation compared to a regime that would require corporations
to publish complete returns. While the one-page Form 1120
states a corporation’s items of gross income (such as gross
profit, gross rents, and capital gains) and its tax deductions
(such as interest payments, salary expenses and depreciation),
all of the figures are reported in the aggregate.419 By reviewing
the Form 1120 only, a corporation’s competitors would be un-
able to determine the inner workings of the corporation, in-
cluding its future business plans. If necessary, the proposal
could be amended to allow corporations to request redaction
of specific lines that could reveal proprietary information,
such as Line 22, Advertising.420 But since these lines do not
reveal detailed information about specific expenses, the
threshold for redaction should be high.
Furthermore, without the risk of exposure of proprietary
information, a proposal to require publication of Form 1120
416. I.R.C. §§ 165, 172 (2012); see supra notes 82–84.
417. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (2012).
418. I.R.S. Form 1120.
419. Id.
420. I.R.S. Form 1120, l. 22, (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-pdf/f1120.pdf.
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only is unlikely to discourage corporations from cooperating
with the IRS. As opposed to a measure that would result in
publication of an entire corporate tax return, publication of
the Form 1120 would not reveal proprietary details underlying
the items on each line. One minor cooperation risk is that cor-
porate tax directors could limit disclosure of information on
the required schedules, forms, and accompanying documents
out of concern that the move to publish Form 1120 only signi-
fies the beginning for a push in the United States to require
publication of all corporate tax return information. Policymak-
ers could address this concern explicitly in legislation or in the
debates leading up to the enactment of the legislation by stat-
ing that public access applies only to Form 1120 and not to
other related documentation.421
Public Awareness and Debate. Publication of the single-page
Form 1120 would present to the pubic and investors signifi-
cantly more information about a corporation’s tax liabilities
and payments than is available today. Form 1120 reveals a cor-
poration’s taxable income, its net operating losses for that
year, and its total tax or refund.422 Publication of Form 1120
would reveal in clear and concise terms, information that
would inform the public and investors and stimulate public de-
bate. For example, rather than requiring the public to deci-
pher GAAP figures presented in publicly filed financial state-
ments, which are often mischaracterized in reports by the me-
dia,423 Form 1120 would reveal a corporation’s effective tax
rate for a single year, calculated using federal income tax con-
cepts.424 As another example, the public could compare the
tax liability and payments of corporations within different in-
dustries. Scholars could consider trends among corporations
in different industries, such as technology versus manufactur-
ing, which could educate the public and policymakers regard-
ing the relative tax burdens of different types of corpora-
tions.425 Finally, by matching the new information revealed
421. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(c) (2012).
422. I.R.S. Form 1120, ll. 28, 29(a), 30–36 (2013), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120.pdf.
423. See supra note 281.
424. I.R.S. Form 1120 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f 1120.pdf.
425. See, e.g., Jennifer C. Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidence: A Review of Empir-
ical Estimates and Analysis (Congress. Budget Office, Working Paper 2011-01,
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about a corporation’s U.S. tax liability with its global cash taxes
paid (reported in its financial statements, though using GAAP
concepts),426 commentators could highlight the portion of a
corporation’s total taxes that are paid the U.S. government
and to non-U.S. governments. In contrast to publication of
complete tax returns, therefore, requiring publicly traded cor-
porations to publish their Form 1120 annually would reveal
valuable information to the public without exacerbating cor-
porate tax aggressiveness or harming the IRS’s enforcement
efforts.
2. Schedule M-3
Policymakers should also support, either as a stand-alone
measure or in addition to required public disclosure of Form
1120 only, a requirement that publicly traded corporations dis-
close their Schedule M-3, Net Income (Loss) Reconcilia-
tion.427 Since its re-release in 2004, Schedule M-3 has been de-
scribed as a “Rosetta Stone,”428 a “vital roadmap”429 and
“landmark achievement.”430 For years, IRS agents could not
determine the elements of the difference between a corpora-
tion’s financial accounting (book) and U.S. taxable income,
which in the aggregate exceeded $200 billion in some years,
without pursuing a thorough audit of corporations’ financial
statements and tax returns.431 Upon its re-release in 2004, the
IRS proclaimed that this form would enable it to identify tax-
payers that “engaged in aggressive transactions and therefore
should be audited.”432
2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/
122xx/doc12239/06-14-2011-corporatetaxincidence.pdf.
426. See Gravelle, supra note 77 and accompanying text.
427. I.R.S. Schedule M-3 (Form 1120) (2013), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-access/f1120sm3_accessible.pdf.
428. Hearing before the S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/061306testek.pdf (testi-
mony of Edward D. Kleinbard).
429. Shaviro, supra note 42, at 477.
430. Charles E. Boynton et al., A First Look at 2007 Schedule M-3 Reporting by
Large Corporations, in TAX NOTES SPECIAL REPORT 689 (2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/firstlook2007schedulem3.pdf
431. Hearing before the S. Comm. on Fin., supra note 428.
432. IRS Announces Release of Schedule M-3 for Corporations, 2004 TAX NOTES
TODAY 131–16 (2004).
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Schedule M-3 is a three-page document that large corpo-
rations, those with assets of $10 million or more, file with the
IRS along with their annual tax returns, which requires them
to reconcile the differences between their book and U.S. taxa-
ble income on a consolidated basis.433 The schedule highlights
book/tax differences in reporting in specific areas such as de-
ductions for stock option exercises, charitable contributions of
intangible property, meal expenses, deferred compensation,
foreign income tax expense, corporate owned life insurance,
among many other items.434 Schedule M-3 specifically requires
corporations to highlight book/tax differences resulting from
reportable transactions, those potentially abusive transactions
that the IRS requires corporations to disclose to the IRS using
separate forms.435 As a result of the lucidity provided by Sched-
ule M-3 regarding a corporation’s financial and taxable in-
come, several commentators have called on policymakers to
require publicly traded corporations to publicly disclose this
schedule.436
Strategic Defenses. Mandatory publication of Schedule M-3
would pose minimal risk to the strategic defenses of corporate
tax privacy. Schedule M-3 itself, without any supporting ex-
planatory documents, would not reveal whether the corpora-
tion engaged in specific potentially abusive transactions or ag-
gressive transfer pricing structures. The schedule requires cor-
porations to report the aggregate book/tax difference
resulting from reportable transactions, but does not require
the corporation to describe amounts attributable to any spe-
cific transaction or strategy.437 Again, certain significant re-
portable transaction statements—such as those involving losses
of $10 million or more, or ones that are subject to confidenti-
ality provisions438—involve non-abusive tax strategies. Nor
would it reveal whether the IRS challenged specific tax strate-
433. I.R.S. Instructions for Schedule M-3 (Form 1120) (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120sm3.pdf.
434. I.R.S. Schedule M-3, pt. III (Form 1120) (2013), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-access/f1120sm3_accessible.pdf.
435. I.R.S. Schedule M-3, pt. II, l. 12 (Form 1120) (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-access/f1120sm3_accessible.pdf.
436. See, e.g., Canellos & Kleinbard, supra note 42; Shaviro, supra note 42.
437. I.R.S. Instructions for Schedule M-3 (Form 1120) (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120sm3.pdf.
438. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-5(i)(A) (2014).
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gies, or applied tax shelter penalties against the corporation.
As long as the accompanying documents, which would reveal
more information,439 are not required to be published, the
risk that a corporation’s stakeholders and advisors would en-
gage in benchmarking or reverse engineering after reviewing
competitors’ publicly available Schedule M-3’s is low.
Proprietary Information. While Schedule M-3 reveals a cor-
poration’s income and expenses from specified items, it re-
quires the corporation to report this information using aggre-
gate figures.440 The accompanying explanatory documents
that are filed with Schedule M-3 contain much more detailed
information about the corporation’s business operations, in
both the U.S. and abroad, which, if accessible, competitors
could use to their advantage. If corporations are only required
to publish Schedule M-3 and not these accompanying docu-
ments, they do not subject themselves to significant risk of ex-
posing sensitive proprietary information.
As Schedule M-3 does not reveal significant proprietary
information, a public disclosure requirement would be un-
likely to discourage cooperation by corporate taxpayers. Cor-
porations already report financial income (loss) to sharehold-
ers using GAAP principles; they report taxable income to the
IRS using U.S. federal income tax principles. Additionally, IRS
officials have implied that failure to file the required Schedule
M-3 could result in increased tax penalties on non-disclosed
reportable transactions and transactions that lack economic
substance,441 as well as tax penalties for failure to file a tax
return.442 If investors could observe a corporation’s failure to
file the Schedule M-3, they would also likely speculate about
the reasons for this failure. Given these incentives, there is lit-
tle reason to expect that a publication requirement would di-
minish corporations’ willingness to complete and file Sched-
ule M-3 with the IRS. The opportunities for corporations to
mask book/tax differences in the face of a Schedule M-3 pub-
lic disclosure requirement are limited. Corporations strive to
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. I.R.C. §§ 6662(i), 7701(o) (2012).
442. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) for Form 1120 Schedule M-3, I.R.S.,
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Frequently-Asked-Questions-
(FAQs)-for-Form-1120-Schedule-M-3 (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
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report the greatest book income possible to shareholders. To
obfuscate the book/tax difference, corporations would have to
increase their reporting of taxable income, such as by forgoing
non-abusive tax deductions, such as accelerated depreciation,
or otherwise avoiding other strategies that result in tax losses.
Public Awareness and Debate. A requirement that corpora-
tions publish Schedule M-3 would create a unique platform for
educating policymakers, investors, the media and the general
public and for stimulating public debate. Compared to Form
1120, which focuses only on taxable income and tax liability,
Schedule M-3 shows why a corporation’s financial accounting
and U.S. taxable income differ from one another. Thus, access
to the publicly available Schedule M-3 filings could encourage
debate about specific items that lead to these differences. For
instance, after reviewing the Schedule M-3 of specific con-
sumer corporations and observing some of the most signifi-
cant book/tax differences, commentators might question why
Congress bestows special depreciation deductions on invest-
ment in certain assets443 or allows special tax benefits for cor-
porate-owned life insurance.444 Conversely, commentators
might question why financial accounting rules treat certain
items as income, where the tax law does not. Again, the intro-
duction of high profile, named corporations into the public
forum would likely stimulate interest from journalists and
commentators in ways that technical statutory and regulatory
language does not.
Publication of Schedule M-3 would attract media atten-
tion, but importantly, would also result in more accurate com-
munication regarding corporate tax issues by journalists to the
general public. One incentive for the media to focus on
Schedule M-3 is that the schedule requires corporations to re-
port income (loss) stemming from reportable transactions.445
While the media may focus on this item, again, it does not
necessarily reveal that a corporation has engaged in shady tax
planning. Yet, faced with media scrutiny of this line, represent-
atives of a large multinational corporation could feel com-
pelled to provide additional voluntary explanation publicly.
443. I.R.S. Schedule M-3, pt. III, l. 31 (Form 1120) (2013), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-access/f1120sm3_accessible.pdf.
444. Id. at pt. III, l. 33.
445. Id. at pt. II, l. 12.
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More importantly, today, journalists report on the tax affairs of
household-name corporations using publicly available finan-
cial statements only, disregarding important differences be-
tween financial and tax accounting.446 With the Schedule M-
3’s of these same corporations, journalists could begin to rec-
ognize these differences and deliver better analysis of corpora-
tions’ financial state and tax activities. Public access to Sched-
ule M-3 thus has tremendous potential to facilitate public dis-
cussion and debate of the differential financial and tax
accounting treatment of large corporations, taxation of corpo-
rations with significant overseas operation and the legitimacy
of corporate tax expenditures.
3. Corporate Pink Slips
Finally, instead of requiring corporations to publish spe-
cific pages from their corporate tax returns or related sched-
ules, policymakers could consider an alternative route to pub-
lic disclosure: a corporate “pink slip,” similar to the concept
envisioned by Congress in 1934.447 What could a corporate
pink slip contain? The answer to this question depends on the
preferences of policymakers and the public’s demand for in-
formation. Since 1934, U.S. corporations have vastly increased
their global operations and the number of corporate tax ex-
penditure provisions in the Internal Revenue Code has grown
substantially.448 As an illustration, the corporate pink slip
could present, on a consolidated basis, a publicly traded cor-
poration’s (1) U.S. tax liability; (2) U.S. deferred tax liability;
(3) U.S. taxable income; (4) U.S. cash taxes paid; (5) taxes
paid to state and local governments in the U.S.; (6) taxes paid
to non-U.S. governments (as discussed earlier);449 (7) global
taxable income; and (8) specific tax credits, such as the for-
eign tax credit and the research and development credit,
claimed. This document would be based on information con-
tained in corporate tax returns and could be publicly filed ei-
446. See supra note 280.
447. Revenue Act of May 10, 1934, ch. 277, § 55(b), 48 Stat. 680, 698.
448. For discussion, see Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share
of U.S. Multinational Company Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Global-
ized, (U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Working Paper 103,
2012).
449. See supra note 411 and accompanying text.
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ther as part of the tax footnote in financial statements in Form
10-K or as a separate attachment.450
Strategic Defenses. Like the proposals to require publication
of Form 1120 only and the Schedule M-3, the corporate pink
slip proposal poses little risk to the strategic defenses of corpo-
rate tax privacy. The figures reported would be aggregate
figures. Stakeholders could observe a competitor’s low pay-
ment of taxes or significant amounts of foreign tax credits, but
this information would not reveal whether the competitor had
complied with IRS disclosure requirements, engaged in re-
portable transactions or pursued aggressive transfer pricing
techniques. Again, even if a corporation’s pink slip reveals that
its U.S. tax liability or tax rate for the year are low compared to
other corporations, this information does not necessarily show
that the corporation’s tax director has achieved that result by
pursuing aggressive tax strategies.451 And as the pink slip
would not describe specific deficiency disputes or settlements,
it would not enable corporate tax directors or advisors to draw
conclusions regarding tax enforcement strategies of the IRS.
Proprietary Information. The corporate pink slip would not
reveal proprietary information of a corporation other than the
amount of the aggregate figures required to be reported, such
as taxes paid to the U.S. federal, state, local, and foreign gov-
ernments. Corporations could continue to share information
with the IRS on required schedules and forms and in coopera-
tive settings, such as the Compliance Assurance Program, with-
out the threat of public exposure of this information.452 As a
statutory matter, the corporate pink slip could be treated as
separate from “return information”453 that is protected by tax
privacy. Corporations thus would still receive the protection of
tax privacy with respect to their tax returns and all information
provided to the IRS.
Public Awareness and Debate. In contrast to certain tax
forms and schedules, policymakers could design the corporate
pink slip with the explicit objective of providing comprehensi-
450. See INCOME TAXES, Accounting Standards Codification, § 740-10 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 2009).
451. See supra notes 414–18.
452. See Compliance Assurance Process, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/Businesses
/Corporations/Compliance-Assurance-Process (last visited Nov. 5, 2014).
453. I.R.C. § 6103(b)(1) (2012).
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ble corporate tax information to the public as opposed to the
IRS. For example, by requiring corporations to disclose both
their annual U.S. tax liability, which would flow directly from
the Form 1120, and taxes paid to non-U.S. governments, the
pink slip could provide a straightforward guide to a specific
corporation’s relative tax burdens in the U.S. versus in other
jurisdictions. With this information, analysts could report both
U.S. and global effective tax rates using actual tax, as opposed
to GAAP, concepts. And rather than focus only on the tax
credits and deductions listed on any individual tax form or
schedule, such as Schedule M-3, the corporate pink slip would
enable policymakers to highlight corporations’ use of specific
tax expenditures, such as the research and development
credit.454
A significant potential drawback of this approach is that it
is susceptible to attempts by corporations to lobby the drafters
of the pink slip to design it in a way that does not cast corpora-
tions as making low or no annual U.S. tax payments. For exam-
ple, representatives of corporations could propose that the
pink slip report a corporation’s taxable income, even though
it paid no cash taxes as a result of net operating losses. When
Congress has required corporations to disclose items in SEC
filings in the past, the SEC has faced pressure from industry as
it formulated the specific terms of the disclosure. For example,
critics have argued that after Congress enacted legislation in
2010 that required publicly traded corporations to disclose the
ratio between the total compensation of a company’s chief ex-
ecutive officer and the median compensation of all other em-
ployees,455 a campaign to influence the SEC’s disclosure rules
by industry associations “effectively brought the agency’s work
on the rule to a standstill.”456 A response to the concern is that
the corporate pink slip should at least contain the precise
figures that the corporation reports on its tax returns, such as
454. I.R.C. § 41 (2012) (expired on Dec. 31, 2013).
455. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 953(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010), amended
by Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 102(a)(3), 126 Stat. 306, 309 (2012).
456. Jerry Markon & Dina ElBoghdady, Dodd-Frank Executive Pay Rule Still
in Limbo Amid Pushback from Corporate America, WASH. POST (July 6, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dodd-frank-executive-pay-rule-
still-in-limbo-amid-pushback-from-corporate-america/2013/07/06/94a8c
9e0-d793-11e2-a9f2-42ee3912ae0e_story.html. I am grateful to Louis Kaplow
for helpful discussions regarding this point.
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U.S. taxable income457 and U.S. tax liability.458 The drafters of
the corporate pink slip could also provide a narrative explana-
tion of the calculation of each reported item. By design, the
corporate pink slip would present key corporate tax informa-
tion in a concise and intelligible manner.
CONCLUSION
By examining the relationship of corporate tax privacy
and tax compliance from a new perspective, this Article has
offered three contributions to the corporate tax privacy de-
bate.
First, this Article has proposed that corporate tax privacy
may limit the pressure to engage in more aggressive tax plan-
ning and reporting practices that corporate tax directors face
from external sources, such as significant shareholders and
non-tax managers, and even from themselves. Specifically, cor-
porate tax privacy provides the government with valuable stra-
tegic defenses by restraining the ability of a corporation’s
stakeholders and agents to engage in benchmarking and re-
verse engineering, behaviors that would likely cause some tax
directors to engage in more aggressive tax planning and re-
porting.
Second, this Article has offered guiding principles that
policymakers should consider when evaluating proposals to
make all or part of corporate tax return information publicly
accessible. As this Article has argued, policymakers should as-
sess each corporate tax return public disclosure proposal sepa-
rately by considering its potential effects on: (1) the strategic
defenses of corporate tax privacy; (2) exposure of proprietary
information of corporate taxpayers; and (3) public awareness
and debate of corporate tax issues.
Last, this Article has evaluated several concrete corporate
tax return public disclosure measures that have been the sub-
ject of debate among policymakers. Applying the principles
described above, it has described several types of return infor-
mation, which disclose details of specific tax positions or IRS
enforcement actions and should not be publicly accessible,
457. I.R.S. Form 1120, l. 30 (2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-pdf/f1120.pdf.
458. Id. at l. 31.
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and other types of return information, including significant
portions of corporate tax returns themselves, which should be
publicly accessible.
The answer to the question of whether the public’s “right
to know” should outweigh corporations’ tax privacy interests is
neither simple nor universal. The more nuanced analysis of
corporate tax privacy presented in this Article should have im-
portant implications for legislators, empirical and legal schol-
ars, government officials, and practitioners.
